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Summary 
 
Cicero wrote in Book Three of On Duties, that the Stoic sage being  absolutely good and and 
perfect was the only one that could be truly happy. For his happiness was based in his virtue 
and as he had perfect virtue, he had perfect and lasting happiness. Yet the Peripatetics saw 
that happiness was not a self-sufficient idea and was instead an amalgamation of external 
goods. Virtue for them was a factor that contributed to happiness, for the Stoics it was 
essential for happiness. It would appear on inital observation that the life of the Stoic sage 
was a solitary one, aloof from the rest of humanity. Yet the Stoics maintained that this was 
the best and happiest form of life, a life lived in accordance with Nature. However, the 
Peripatetics maintained that nature loves nothing solitary and man is not a solitary animal. In 
order for him to fullfill his natural end and achieve eudaimonia he would natually be drawn 
towards the company of others.   
        Cicero highlights the tension between Stoic idealism and Peripatetic pragmatism in his 
discussion on happiness. When he essentially he askes in Book Five of the Tusculan 
Disputations. Is virtue on its own, self-sufficient for happiness? Or is happiness the sum total 
of external goods when joined together? Friendship was a factor in this discussion, as for 
Cicero, friendship is closely tied to human nature and is an important source of happiness. 
Both the Stoics and the Peripatetics would agree that friendship was naturally part of human 
nature, but both would say it played different roles in relation to the achievement of 
happiness. Therefore, a discussion on the nature of friendship found in the Cicero’s On 
Friendship will take place in this thesis and, will see, if in Cicero’s own voice friendship was 
a natural constituent of happiness and therefore was something that was necessarily part of a 
life in accordance with nature.  
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PREFACE 
 
Friendship is such an important part of what is is to be human. For in it we as a species have found a 
mode in which happiness may be maintained and sustained. This is nothing new and is much the same 
as in ancient thought and ancient societies, where friendship was deemed one of the best things in life. 
For friendship is something which, according to the ancients, everyone agrees is worthwhile in life. It 
should be valued amongst all the riches in the world. But Cicero would argue through Laelius in 
Laelius on Friendship that hardly anyone gives it any accord or real thought. Friendship is the way in 
which we are confronted with morality. It fully engages our conscience in our dealings with others 
because as Aristotle wrote a friend is another self.  
Friendship has it origins in natural affection for others and this is how I came to be interested 
in it as a subject. Seeing my brother one day, in a state of distress and anguish I was moved to ask him 
why he was in such a state. He replied that his best friend’s father had just passed away and he was 
feeling the pain of his friend. Such a display of empathy towards his friend moved me. I had a great 
deal of interest in ancient philosophy, particularly in ancient ethics. Having read both Plato- Lysis and 
Aristotle- Nicomachean Ethics, I was already familiar with what these Greeks had to say about 
friendship and turning to Rome I found Seneca. His Moral Letters were a revelation and I quickly 
read through them and found that they provided me with a good basis for daily contemplations, eager 
to read more philosophy from Rome and looking in the library I came across Cicero- On the Good 
Life, trans. by Michael Grant in the library. This short book contained Cicero’s account of friendship. 
I read it enthusastically and was profoundly moved by its content. Cicero’s great love and affection 
for Atticus, to whom he dedicates the account of friendship, is made clearly throughout. This is 
summed up perfectly in the closing paragraph of the book where Laelius beautifully writes of his 
friend being more precious to him than anything the world could offer. One can read in these words 
how Cicero thought about his own friendship with Atticus. The message and advice contained in 
Laelius on Friendship, has endured throughtout the ages and is still relevant in today’s world as 
friendship endures.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In ancient Greek and Roman civilizations, friendship was regarded as an integral part of a 
good society and a good life: a good society, because it was an essential component of 
participative civic politics; and a good life, because in it both wisdom and and happiness were 
nurtured. This period provides us with texts on friendship which, to this day, are arguably the 
most profoud on the subject.
1
 Amongst their authors are Plato, Aristotle and Cicero, who 
were engaged in some of the most important and influencial philosophical discussions 
concerning  friendship. In this thesis I shall discuss the role of friendship according to the 
Stoics as these ideas are reflected in the philosophical writings of Cicero. Special attention 
will be given to the question of the self-sufficiency of the good man against the natural need 
of friendship. 
Friendship was, according to Cicero, a fundamental part of man’s nature, since 
humans were regarded as being primarily naturally social animals. Friendship, then, was not 
only natural but also essential to happiness in one’s life. Yet, there were those who, on the 
one hand, would argue that happiness consisted of having virtue which was totally self-
sufficient and in need of nothing else other than itself; whereas on the other hand, others 
would naturally see happiness as an amalgamation of various external goods, virtue being 
only one of them within the whole scope of man’s life. For Cicero, the question concerning 
the self-sufficiency of happiness was of interest not only philosophically but also socially, 
owing to the unstable and bloody times in which he wrote his philosophical works: when 
stability is not to be found in the world, man must retreat inwards to himself. He shall seek 
stability in his reason which is fully self-sufficient and so find happiness in the tranquillity of 
                                                          
1
 Friendship, In our time, M. Bragg, BBC Radio 4, accessed from internet 4/04/09. 
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peace of mind. But for Cicero this philosophical idea of happiness was simply not enough 
because as a Roman and as a politician, it was in active service to both his fellow Romans 
and his fatherland which should have afforded him all the happiness that he sought.
2
 Yet it 
was to philosophy that Cicero turned at times of great grief in his life, when both his state and 
his countrymen tore each other apart in a bloody civil war. 
Cicero is of particular interest as he has been, unfairly, much maligned as a 
philosopher, regarded, on many occasions by modern scholars as a mere doxographer.
3
 
Against such assessment, Cicero seems to be defending himself by arguing that, although his 
Greek sources have been useful for his books, the way in which those philosophies were both 
presented and discussed was his own. He is a gracious writer and Powell mentions that one 
should not:  
underestimate the factor of popularization for a Roman audience, catered for as 
much by the dialogue form with its Roman characters and settings as by the 
attempts to ‘teach philosophy to speak Latin, for the benefit of readers who 
knowledge of philosophical Greek might not have been extensive.
4 
                                                          
2
Cicero, Laelius de Amicitia & Somnium Scipionis (Laelius on Friendship and The dream of Scipio), ed. 
and trans. J.Powell (Warminster: Aris&Philips Ltd., 1990), pp. 21-23 (from the introduction). The translations 
of the works of Cicero that I am using in this thesis come almost entirely from the Loeb Classical Library: De 
Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, ed. and trans. by H. Rackham (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1914), 
Tusculanae Disputationes, ed. and trans. by J.E King (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1927), De Natura 
Deorum, ed. and trans. by H. Rackham (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1933), De Officiis, ed. and trans. by 
W. Miller (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1913), De Academica, ed and trans. by H. Rackham (London: Leob 
Classical Library, 1933), De Legibus, ed. and trans. by C.W.Keyes (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1928), 
Plutarch: ‘The Life of Cicero’ in Parallel Lives Vol. 8. ed. and trans. by B.Perrin (London: Loeb Classical 
Library, 1914). Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, Vols. 1 & 3. henceforth refered to as S.V.F., by I.Von Arnim 
(Stutgardiae: In Aedibus B.G Teubneri, 1903-5). Elsewhere where other works of Cicero are used, reference and 
full detail is given in the footnotes. 
3
 Cicero, Ep. ad Atticum, 12.52.3: ‘De lingua latina secure es animi. Dices: ‘Qui talia conscribes απὀγραφα 
sunt, minore labore fiunt; verba tantum adfero, quibus abundo.’ ed and trans. by E.O. Winstedt (London: Loeb 
Classical Library, 1912). Cicero appears to label himself a mere copier of Greek philosophy. A case of false 
modesty perhaps. In On Duties, 1.6, he declares that although he will draw inspiration from the ‘sources’ 
previously mentioned (the Peripatetics and the Stoics whom he chooses to follow in this book) he will work 
with them and judge them as he sees fit to suit his own purpose. This would incline one to believe that it might 
be false modesty that has Cicero call himself a mere doxographer and the truth is that he in fact will offer the 
reader a book on philosophical thought, which would be considered original in both it’s content, method and 
formulation. Cicero, De Officiis, 1.6: ‘e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo 
videbitur, haurimus.’ See also, Cicero the Philosopher ed. By J.Powell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), p.9. and A.E. Douglas, ‘Form and Content in the Tusculan Disputations’ in Cicero the Philosopher, n.11, 
p.203.  
4
 Ibid., p.9. also see Powell, ‘Cicero’s translatations from Greek’, in Cicero the Philosopher,  pp.290-291. 
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Cicero writes with a sympathetic patriotic flavour for his Roman audience, evidenced by his  
understanding of Roman society and it’s social decorum, and in it’s private obligations and 
public expectations and also by giving Roman examples when philosophizing about Roman 
issues. Cicero himself asked, if the Greeks are given Greek exemplars then why should the 
Romans not have Roman examples?
5
 To illustrate this point Cicero writes in On Duties about 
the problems facing the Roman people concerning war, and indeed what makes war just
6
; in 
On Friendship he argues just how far duties toward a friend will extend
7
,and also which is 
more important, duty towards a country or towards a friend?
8
  
Cicero’s philosophical works are thus not merely summaries and translations from the 
Greek sources, and this will require looking at them from two points of view: the first being 
linguistically, and this is in reference to the fact that he is writing philosophy in Latin, 
hitherto never done before in Roman literature.
9
 These works included translations from the 
Greek of some key philosophical concepts. By doing so, Cicero created a new corpus of 
philosophical language and by default a new readership.
10
 The second is that in writing 
philosophy in his native language he was able to offer to Roman readers a collection of 
philosophical books tailor made for them.
11
 By introducing Roman standards in his works he 
was writing philosophy in a very Roman way, ever mindful of his audience, taking into 
account how the Romans saw the world both politically and socially.
12
 Placing emphasis on 
                                                          
5
 Cicero, De Finibus, 1.6: ‘Quodsi Graeci leguntur a Graecis, iisdem de rebus alia ratione compositis, quid est 
cur nostri a nostris non legantur?’ 
6
 Cicero, De Officiis, 1. 34-40.  
7
 Cicero, De Amicitia, 36-48. 
8
 Ibid., 56-61. 
9
 Powell, Cicero the Philosopher,  pp.30-31. 
10
 See Powell, ‘Cicero’s translatations from Greek’, in Cicero the Philosopher,  pp.288-300. 
11
 J.Powell, ‘Cicero’, in Greek and Roman Philosophy 100BC to 200AD, Vol 2. ed. by R.W.Sharples and R. 
Sorabji (London: University of London, 2007), p. 56. 
12
 Cicero, De Finibus, 1.7. 
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practicality over theory would be a good way to describe this Ciceronian philosophy. As a 
self-professed Academic Sceptic Cicero is using whatever philosophical school he wishes 
when writing his works. Cicero’s own background in oratory was manifested in his 
understanding of language. He was also the first to fully expound and give hardened 
philosophical investigation into the main schools of Hellenistic thought. In Cicero we find the 
Roman embodiment of the best form of life,  the ideal combination between the best and 
most choiceworthy of lives, namely the man engaged in living the contemplative life, and the 
man fully at ease in the political one.
13
 It is this balanced approach to life that has made 
Cicero according to my understanding, a man for all seasons.
14
  
Cicero, just like most learned men of his time, mastered the Greek language from an 
early age;
15
 he saw it as his Roman civic duty to give the Romans a philosophy in their own 
language,
16
 mainly for the the purpose of education.
17
 He was heavily influenced by two 
great Stoic philosophers: Panaetius and Posidonius; the latter he knew personally, and both of 
these men had a very different outlook from that of the early Stoics. While the early Stoics 
considered the sage to be the highest achievement of the rational being, both Panaetius and 
Posidonious saw that this was merely an ideal and not attainable in the world they inhabited. 
They stressed, therefore, the importance not of outright imitation but of the nearest and best 
way to get close to the idea of the sage in real life. As I shall try to show in this thesis, this 
‘humane Stoicism’ was brought to bear in Cicero’s writings, for example, in On Duties, On 
Friendship and also the Tusculan Disputations. However, Cicero didn’t allow himself to fully 
side with either the Peripatetics or the Stoics. The reason for this is his firm allegiance to the 
                                                          
13
 Aristotle, Politics, 7.1325a17-1325b37.  
14
 J. Powell, Cicero the Philosopher  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.40. 
15
 Plutarch, The Life of Cicero, 4.3-4. 
16
 Cicero, Academica, 1.9-13. 
17
 Cicero, De Officiis, 1.6 ; De Finibus, 1.10; De Divinatione, 2.1-7. 
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Academic Sceptic School, whose bywords were both probabile and veri simile’.18 These 
concepts, coming from Philo of Larissa, were used by the Academic Sceptics and referred to 
their method not to accept any doctrine as the truth, so long we are not presented with a 
criterion for this truth. Thus, they would only agree up to a certain point, but never commit 
themselves to any particular dogma or doctrine, unlike other Hellenistic philosophical 
schools. And so, at the outset of Book Five of the Tusculan Disputations, Cicero reminds the 
reader of his intention, saying that he will conceal his own opinion, follow much in the same 
manner of the Academic Sceptics, and urged his readers to look for the most probable 
solution: 
I have chosen particularly to follow that one [school] which I think agreeable to 
the practice of  Socrates, in trying to conceal my own private opinion, to relieve 
others from deception and in every discussion to look for the most probable 
solution.
19
 
 
When reading Cicero the reader must at all times be aware of this element in his 
philosophical writings and not expect him to fully support one position over the other.  
As we shall see in this thesis, Cicero is using, on the one hand, the views of the 
Peripatetics in moral issues and argues against the Stoic postion; and on the other hand he is 
employing Stoic notions in his arguments against the Peripatetics position. This thesis is 
focused primarily on the question what role friendship and self-sufficiency play in the debate 
concerning happiness, as discussed in the philosophical writings of Cicero. The work itself 
will consist of two parts: the first being concerned with Cicero’s account of the Stoic and the 
Peripatetic position with regard to virtue and in relation to the happy life. The differences 
                                                          
18
 For a further discussion on this see J. Glucker’s article on ‘Probabile, Veri Simile, and Related Terms’ in 
Cicero the Philosopher, pp. 115-143. 
19
 Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 5.11: E quibus nos id potissimum consecuti sumus, quo Socratem usum 
arbitrabamur, ut nostrum ipsi sententiam tegeremus, errore alios levaremus et in omni disputatione quid esset 
simillimum veri quaereremus. Powell gives details of reference towards this fact in Cicero’s other writings. See, 
Powell, Cicero the Philosopher, p. 40. 
11 
 
between the sage and the rest of humanity according to the early Stoics, and how in later 
years the theories of the early school were modified and altered by the members of the middle 
school of the Stoics, will be also discussed. Since the Stoic philosophical system was 
essentially a unity of physics, logic and ethics, all of these areas were important and none 
were deemed obsolete. Thus, Physics (i.e., the structure of physical reality or nature) and 
logic (i.e., the structure of our mind and the way we think, using concepts, etc. were) closely 
tied with ethics (i.e., the way we should act in the world), and the discussion of happiness 
will inevitablly include aspects of these areas.   
The second part of the thesis will begin with a discussion concerning the modification 
and redesign of the theories of the early Stoics by Panaetius and Posidonious. I shall examine 
here the division of both human nature and the universal nature, which led to a focus on 
individual accountability and responsibility. The result of this, I would contend, was the 
gradual marginalisation of the ideal sage, and the embrace of a more pragmatic approach in 
ethics. Nothing defines this better than the theory of oikeiosis, which, already given a brief 
explanation in the first part, will be discussed in further detail in the second part. Oikeiosis 
was understood by the Stoics as a natural aspect of human evolution. Friendship was part of 
this evolution and so part of a life deemed in accordance with nature and not separate from it. 
The second part will then conclude with a discussion of friendship which incorporated the 
theory of oikeiosis and would appear to show that self-sufficiency in theory was an admirable 
idea, but it was to become less and less important in Stoic philosophical understanding 
throughout the years, finally superseded by a more practical approach that was defined by 
oikeiosis. In the course of my own research I have found that as a subject in it’s own right the 
Stoic theory of oikeiosis has been surprisingly very little written about it. From the literature 
that I have read and researched not one has specifically dealt with oikeiosis within the context 
of friendship solely.  
12 
 
Cicero while writing about the phenomonon of oikeiosis in book 3 of On Ends, 
describes it as the way in which the individual appropriates various externals to itself. In this 
way the image of the concentric circles comes into mind. Placing The individual at the center with 
the various external appropriations forming other circles that lead out from the individual at the 
center. In the modern context G. Striker offers a general account of oikeiosis in chapter 
thirteen of Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics
20
, this general account gives a very 
good if not thoroughly inventive overview of the theory. She also has written a very good 
paper on specifically the influence of Greek philosophy on Cicero entitled ‘Cicero and Greek 
Philosophy’ in the Harvard Studies in Classical Philology.21 Oikeiosis is an extremely 
difficult term to define in English and Pembroke has certainly pointed this fact out in his 
essay on oikeiosis in A.A.Longs’ Problems in Stoicism.22 C.O. Brink also points out the 
relative simularity in the Peripatetic term of oikeiotes and the Stoic term oikeiosis under 
Theophrastus and Zeno.
23
 Brink is attempting to show that there was not so much difference 
between the two terms and how the Stoic term rose out of and evolved from the Peripatetic 
one. Mary Whitlock Blundell however, goes another route and gives an insightful explanation 
of the term by splitting it into two parts, namely the personal( towards ourselves) and the 
social( towards others) in her essay ‘Parental Nature and Stoic oikeiosis’, in Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy Volume X,
24
 an idea given further thought and explanation by Gretchen 
Reydams-Schils in a chapter from her investigation into the Roman Stoics, under the title 
Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility and Affection.
25
 The chapter entitled ‘From Self-
                                                          
20
 G. Striker, Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,1996) 
21
 G.Striker, ‘Cicero and Greek Philosophy’ in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 97. Greece in 
Rome: Influence, integration and Resistance (The Dept. of Classics Harvard, Harvard University, 1995) 
22
 Problems in Stoicism, ed. by A .A. Long, (Essex, University of London, 1971). 
23
 C.O.Brink, ‘Oikeiosis and Oikeiotes, Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in moral theory’, in Phronesis I, 
(1956). 
24
 M. Blundell, ‘Parental Nature and Stoic oikeiosis’, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Volume X 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990). 
25
 G. Reydams-Schils, Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility and Affection, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
2005). 
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sufficiency to human bonding’ moves away from distinguishing between the philosophical 
schools understanding on the terms, ala. C.O.Brink and instead concerntrates in how it was 
understood in a specifically Roman context. It is a different account in the sense that it deals 
with the Roman reception of oikeiosis. Roman social and cultural patterns of behaviour were 
different from that of the Greeks and any philosophical concepts that were to be offered to the 
Romans had to be romanticised. Reydams-Schils gives a very good and thourough 
investigation into this evolution.  
The Danish scholar Troels Engberg-Pedersen presents a work on the development of 
Stoic moral philosophy in his book.: The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and 
Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy.
26
 He proceeds in the book to present four 
different perspectives on the development of oikeiosis and it’s important place within the 
nexus of Stoic ethical philosophy. While he is not willing to fully accept the views of both G. 
Striker and A.A.Long in concern to oikieosis and at times can be muddled in his arguments. 
Pedersen provides a very thorough account of the development of oikeiosis and its 
importance in Stoic ethical philosophy. Malcolm Schofeild writes about oikeiosis in his essay 
concerning ‘Two Stoic approaches to Justice’ in Justice and Generosity, Studies in 
Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy.
27
 Schofield aligns his understanding of oikeiosis 
with that of the Stoic understanding of Justice. Laws binded the universe together and as 
humans had within them the vestige of divinity, that humans and divinity shared reason, so 
too did humanity share a common bond with one another. This bond, formed and maintained 
in reason, was manifest in order that flourished in and under laws. Thus turning the mindset 
from one that looked inwards, found within the individual polis, of ancient Greece and 
                                                          
26
 T. E. Pedersen: The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic 
Philosophy. Studies in Hellenistic Civilisation, 2. ( Aarhus, Aarhus University Press, 1990). 
27
 M. Schofield, ‘Two Stoic approaches to Justice’ in Justice and Generosity, Studies in Hellenistic Social and 
Political Philosophy in Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellisticum, ed. by A.Laks and M.Schofield 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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instead looked outward to a common fellowship of man, the world city or cosmopolis. 
Schofield argues quiet coherently and effectively that the very foundation of this fellowship 
is the notion of Oikeiosis. I have followed the arguments of Schofield in my own research 
and along with input from both Reydams-Schils and Pembroke have attempted to show that 
Oikeiosis was at the heart of Stoic concepts of friendship. Because it allowed for friendship to 
occur natually. In accordance with Schofeild’s argument fellowship was a natural product of 
oikeiosis and therefore plays a central part in it’s development and also the development of 
Stoic ethical philosophy.  
In my own approach in this thesis I shall follow Japp Mansfeild’s remark found in his 
introductory essay on the use of sources, in the Cambridge History of Hellenstic 
Philosophy.
28
 I shall thus focus on the original sources, in this case, Cicero’s philosophical 
dialogues and whenever possible and relevant, Cicero’s sources. Modern scholarly literature 
will be used were necessary, in order to emiliorate our understanding of Cicero’s arguments 
and explore in further detail different philosophical implications found in them. One of the 
reasons for following Mansfeld is that he gives an excellent historical example of the later 
writers and interpreters of Platonic philosophy, who took the criticisms of the other schools 
of thought and incorporated them into the new and ’updated’ commentaries and translations 
of the Platonic texts. By doing so, they hoped that all criticism of the school would be muted 
and the ‘original’ philosophy of Plato would be presented as a flawless system. Unaware of 
all this, the philosophy student would be given an inaccurate version of the original 
philosophical system, now protected from all criticism due to the criticial incorporation of the 
other school of thought by way of different branches of the Platonic tree, which left little 
space to study the original works by any of the other schools of thought.
29
 In the light of this 
                                                          
28
 J.Mansfeld, ‘Sources’  in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy  ed. by K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. 
Mansfeld, & M. Schofield (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 3-31.  
29
 Ibid, p.4. 
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historical example I have decided to remain as close as possible to the sources, and as 
Mansfeld says:  
From a historical point of view the information provided by the original work of 
a philosopher is to be preferred to a later rendering, rehash, or reinterpretation, 
however competent or philosophically interesting, much work has been done to 
ferret out the lost original sources of the derivative sources for Hellenistic 
philosophy which we still have.
30
 
 
If there are certain parts in this thesis that are repetitivive, then this is in following the method 
of Cicero, who himself has been accused and who was aware of it, and also according to 
Powell, a certain degree of repetition in argument is acceptable since: 
In dealing with what is often rather difficult and (to the original audience) 
unfamiliar subject matter, it was necessary to ensure clarity of presentation, and 
every teacher knows that for that purpose it is sometimes necessary to say things 
a number of ways in varied phrasing.
31
 
 
I hope that this thesis will show and thus, demonstrate that friendship is a natural and integral 
part of man’s happiness. It is born of the good, nurtured in goodness and can only, when 
properly practiced be the key element in the achievement of happiness.  
 
Literature Review 
 
When engaging with the question above, it became clear to me that while there was a vast 
amount of general literature available on the subject of friendship in Greek and Roman 
thought. There was hardly any literature available on the specific subject of friendship as 
written of and explicated by Marcus Tullius Cicero and also the subject of self-sufficiency 
                                                          
30
 Ibid, pp.13. 
31
 J.Powell, ‘Introduction’ in Cicero the Philosopher, p. 10. 
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and happiness in relation to how the Stoics viewed it. The subject of oikeiosis also has been 
written about, but yet never really in a specific way since Cicero himself made it the focal 
point of his argument in both his philosophical works dealing with On Duties and also On 
Friendship.  
David Konstan in Friendship in the Classical World
32
 attempts to give the reader an 
insight into how friendship was perceived in the Classical World. This was the first book of 
its kind to give a fully comprehensive study of the subject in the Ancient World. It follows 
the format of a general survey of the subject and paces itself through the case studies in 
chronological order, namely friendship in the Archaic, Greek, Hellenistic, Roman and finally 
the Christian world. General themes are discussed and the themes are put into case studies, 
namely, phila, Roman friendship, Cicero and Friendship, Friendship amongst women, 
Christian agape. While Konstan attempts to give a new and up-to-date study of the subject. 
For example, offering a new insight into the term philia so that it is not an all encompassing 
term with a wide reach as once thought and also suggesting that friendship in the ancient 
world was based not on obligatory social responsibility but rather on the premise that it was a 
very personal relationship that was based on generosity and affection. He labours his points 
however, and in a sense comes across as a scientist, who, having developed his theories sets 
out to prove them in the real world. Happy to make his theories fit where he wishes. He 
begins with an anthropological account and understanding of friendship to start his narrative 
and put his case studies in some perspective, then later in the book he appears to dismiss this 
anthropological definition and indeed asks the reader if much of the anthropological 
definitions are in fact relevant to a discussion aimed at friendship in the classical world. The 
end result is a book that while interesting in a general sense, should only be left for that 
understanding.  
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In offering a study of the influence of Greek philosophy on the Romans, Miriam .T. 
Griffin and Jonathan Barnes present, Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman 
Society.
33
 This is a scholarly collection of papers and features amongst them a paper by David 
Sedley on the Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World. In this paper Sedley 
argues, convincingly, that what gives philosophical schools in the Hellenistic period an 
identity is less to do with searching for the truth and more to do with the almost religious zeal 
attached to following the schools founder as the ultimate and final authority in all matters. He 
says this phenomenon was found all over the schools of the Hellenistic period. The 
Epicureans provide the prime example for Sedley in this article. However, Ivor Ludlum in his 
article on the myth of the Stoic school, ‘Two Long Running Stoic Myths: A Centralized 
Orthodox Stoic School and Stoic Scholarchs’34 refutes this claim. He argues that there was in 
fact no Stoic school per se and that the Stoics didn’t see their foundering fathers as having the 
ultimate authority in all matters. Cicero, himself, mentions at the beginning of De Natura 
Deorum that he is no follower of Pythagoras, in that he would not be one to go blindly along 
with the teachings of the founder as being sacrosanct. Another book dealing with the subject 
of philosophy in Rome is Mark Morford’s The Roman Philosophers: from the Time of Cato 
the Censor to The Death of Marcus Aurelius.
35
 Morford attempts to bring the subject of 
philosophy in Rome up to date. He draws very much from the influence of the Philosophia 
Togata by Griffin and Barnes and gives his first chapter this title. Aiming perhaps to show 
that philosophy in Rome is still considered by many to be a Greek creation draped in the 
dress of the Roman elite. While Griffin and Barnes book took a philosophical approach in 
both content and context, Morford being a Classist and best known as a writer/commentator 
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on Roman literature attempts to look at the history of ideas in the historical context, rather 
than the particular Roman context into which philosophy was contemplated, constructed and 
written in.  
Dealing specifically with Cicero and philosophy, one of the most comprehensive and 
important books to come out in the last thirteen years has been Jonathan Powell. (ed.) Cicero 
the Philosopher.
36
 This book, much like Philosophia Togata, takes twelve papers from 
renowned Cicero scholars, among them, J. Glucker, R. M. Wright, A. E. Douglas and R.W 
Sharples and A. A. Long. Powell has assembled what is quintessentially a group of scholarly 
papers dealing solely with Cicero as a philosopher an nothing else. The papers collected in 
this book deal with all aspects of the Ciceronian philosophical corpus. R. M. Wright deals 
with the issue of self love and love of humanity in Book Three of De Finibus, while J. 
Glucker deals with the problem of Veri Simile, Probabile and related themes in Cicero. 
Powell’s excellent introduction gives a very good synopsis of the level of interest in the 
philosophical works of Cicero. Glucker continues his investigation into the Ciceronian 
philosophical connection in his book Antiochus and the Late Academy
37
 which is important 
for any serious understanding for the philosophical background of Cicero. Glucker gives a 
lengthy and in depth discussion over to the Sosus affair, concerning Philo of Larissa and the 
argument that eventual turned Antiochus away from the New Academy and towards the 
Stoics and Peripatetics. This would have a profound effect on the young Cicero in his 
philosophical writings in his later years. J. Glucker continues his investigation into the 
philosophical legacy of Cicero by attempting to give an account of Cicero’s apparent 
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eclecticism in John Dillon and Anthony. A. Long, (eds.) The Question of "Eclecticism": 
Studies in Later Greek Philosophy.
38
 
Michael Pakaluk’s Otherselves, Philosophers on Friendship39, gives anyone 
interested in the subject of friendship in philosophy a good collection of sources throughout 
history. It is arranged in chronological order, beginning with Plato Lysis and ends with 
Elizabeth Tefler on Friendship. This general introduction, due to its content is a good and 
worthy book for anyone interested in the issue of friendship in philosophy. Though it gives a 
very brief introductory background at the beginning of all the text’s included, it is mainly a 
good source book for the primary sources rather than any secondary commentary. Mark 
Vernon in The Philosophy of Friendship
40
 and also in The Meaning of Friendship
41
, offer the 
interested reader some interesting thoughts on the subject of friendship. Vernon’s book, 
organised into various theme of friendship covering Plato/Aristotle (Friends and 
Work/Friends and Lovers) to Nietzsche (Faking it) offer some thoughtful and engaging 
contemplations on the subject of friendship, also in The Meaning of Friendship the revised 
and updated version of the Philosophy of Friendship, Vernon offers some new insights into 
the issues surrounding the influence of social networking sites on traditional notions of 
friendship.  
     The Dream of Reason: A history of Philosophy from the Greeks to the Renaissance
42
 
edited by Anthony Gottlieb offers to the reader in and among this general history of 
philosophy a section on Cicero’s influence on philosophy and later thinkers and this is a point 
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maintained and given further reflection by Raymond Phal in On Friendship.
43
 Pahl is a 
sociologist and offers a sociological insight rather than a philosophical insight into the 
subject. Eoin Cassidy in ‘The Significance of Friendship: Reconciling the Classical Ideals of 
Friendship and Self-Sufficiency’ in Amor amicitiae: On the Love that is Friendship: Essays 
in Medieval Thought and Beyond in Honour of the Rev. Professor James McEvoy
44
 gives 
another general account of friendship in the ancient world. In a tribute that is fitting to the life 
and philosophical legacy of Dr James McEvoy. By far the best translation of Cicero, Laelius 
de Amicitia, is provided by J. Powell in, Cicero: Laelius de Amicitia & Somnium Scipionis.
45
 
This updated translation offers a fine introduction, along with the text itself in Latin and 
English, but also an excellent commentary afterwards. The only other translation of note is 
the Loeb version: De Senectute, De Amicitica, De Divinatione.
46
 This version in following 
the same style as the rest of the Loeb Classics offers the complete texts in the original Latin 
and also translated into English with footnote commentaries. Another one of Cicero’s works 
is presented by Aris and Philips, Cicero: Tusculan Disputations II & V with a summary of III 
& IV.
47
 Again following the same method and style as before as in the De Amicitica, this 
book is an excellent and essential copy for anyone interested in Cicero and his ethical 
writings. Douglas’ introduction and complementary notes/commentary are indeed excellent 
and extremely helpful. In a collection in honour of Miriam Griffin titled The Philosophy and 
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Power in the Graeco-Roman World: Essays in Honour of Miriam Griffin.
48
 Another fine 
collection of works from internationally renowned scholars is brought together.  
   Their essays range from Socrates to late antiquity, with a particular focus on Cicero. 
Subjects covered include the Stoics and Cynics, Roman law, the formulation of imperial 
power, Jews and Christians, "performance philosophy," Augustine, late Platonism, and 
women philosophers. Primarily it asks what was if any the connection between the utilization 
of power in the Greco Roman world and philosophical activity. John Harris, contributes a 
paper on Cicero entitled, ‘Cicero and the defining of the Ius Civile’, hoping to see if there 
was an evolution between philosophical speculation and also civil law. Harris affirms that for 
her Cicero’s early experiences in tribunical law in his early life, led directly to their 
influencing him in his theoretical outlining of the constitutional law in De Legibus. In Greek 
and Roman Philosophy 100BC to 200AD vol 2, edited by Raymond Sharples and Richard 
Sorabji.
49
 Another collection of papers is brought together. This volume follows on the first 
volume which dealt with the commentators of both Plato and Aristotle 100 B.C-600 A.D. 
This volume contains thirty five articles and deal with all aspects of philosophical interest and 
thought in the period 100BC to 200AD with focus on the growing influence of Rome in 
Greece. Contributing scholars that include John Sellers, and Jonathan Powell and while 
Seller’s writes about Stoic practical philosophy as a way of life. Powell’s article pertains to 
Cicero’s philosophical development and the influence of the late Academy on him. Anthony 
A. Long’s book ‘From Epicurus to Epictetus, Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy50 
also contains eighteen essays that cover an assortment of topics across the philosophical 
spectrum, ethics, physics, cosmology, epistemology with a focus on the various individuals 
                                                          
48
 Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World: Essays in Honour of Miriam Griffin. ed. by M. T. 
Griffin, G. Clarke & T.  Rakjak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
49
 Greek and Roman Philosophy 100BC to 200AD, Vol 2.  R.W. Sharples, and  R. Sorbabji, eds. (London: 
University of London,  2008). 
50
 A. A. Long, ‘From Epicurus to Epictetus, Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
22 
 
who have contributed to the discussion in the ancient world. In taking their distinctive 
contributions and methodologies into account, an original approach, Professor Long discusses 
Cicero’s attitude towards Plato and Aristotle and also his idea of Politics in De Officiis.  
On Oikeosis, while there has been surprisingly little written on the subject of 
oikeiosis, the literature that has been most useful and has presented itself to me have been. 
Gisela Striker in chapter thirteen of Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics
51
, writes 
about the role of oikeiosis in Stoic Ethics. She also provides an interesting paper on the 
influence of Greek Philosophy on Cicero entitled ‘Cicero and Greek Philosophy’ in the 
Harvard Studies in Classical Philology.
52
 Charles Oscar Brink in ‘Oikeiosis and Oikeiotes, 
Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in moral theory’53, offers a very good investigation into the 
interpretation of both Oikeiosis and Oikeiotes by the Peripatetics and the Stoics under 
Theophrastus and Zeno. While Strikers book is a general account of the role played by 
oikeiosis in Stoic ethical philosophy Brinks paper is far more specific in its context and 
content. Mary Whitlock Blundell gives an account of oikeiosis dealing with the two strands 
of it, namely the personal( towards ourselves) and the social( towards others) aspects in her 
essay ‘Parental Nature and Stoic oikeiosis’, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Volume 
X,
54
 and Gretchen Reydams-Schils also contributes to the subject with a paper on ‘Human 
Bonding and oikeiosis’ in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy volume XXII55 this particular 
paper is in part an early version of a chapter that appeared in her book, Roman Stoics: Self, 
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Responsibility and Affection.
56
 That chapter later renamed ‘From Self-sufficiency to human 
bonding’ provided an in-depth and lengthy study of the Stoic theory of oikeiosis in relation to 
Stoic concepts of friends and the general world around them. Malcolm Schofield also writes 
about oikeiosis in chapter seven of Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellisticum
57
 in ‘Two 
Stoic approaches to Justice’ in Justice and Generosity, Studies in Hellenistic Social and 
Political Philosophy. Schofield also contributes a chapter that explores the concept of 
oikeiosis in Stoics Ethics, the Cambridge Companion to the Stoics.
58
 In this general account 
he offers a discussion of oikeiosis within the context of a explanation of Stoic Ethics. 
S.G.Pembroke writes about oikeiosis in Problems in Stoicism.
59
 Giving a very good account 
on the difficulties of fully explaining what it means. Translations do not quiet give a clear 
picture on this most difficult of terms and at best can only render a general and broad 
definition. Lastly, Troels Engberg-Pedersen presents : The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral 
Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy.
60
Pedersen provides a very 
thorough account of the development of oikeiosis and its importance in Stoic ethical 
philosophy. Pedersen’s book takes to highlight oikeiosis under four different perspectives and 
at times takes umbrage with both Gisela Striker and also Anthony Long in their accounts and 
understanding of oikeiosis. While he (Pedersen) can be obscure and muddled in his 
arguments his book does provide a very interesting piece of research into what is arguably 
one of the most interesting and undeveloped areas of research concerning Stoic philosophy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE SELF-SUFFICIENT SAGE: BETWEEN THE ACADEMIC SCEPTICS AND 
THE STOICS 
 
The focus of this chapter shall be primarily the Stoic concept of ‘self-sufficiency’, within the 
context of Cicero’s moral writings. In particular, how the Stoics placed less emphasis on self-
sufficiency, and imitation of the sage as a fundamental element for happiness in later years 
and instead elevated the importance of the role of society in the achievement happiness. 
Happiness was closely related to the idea of goodness and both the Stoics and the Peripatetics 
had their own ideas of how this might be achieved. Where both had a role and position for 
virtue in this achievement of happiness, both did differ on where exactly that position was.  
Cicero raises this question specifcally in Book Five of the Tusculan Disputations, 
where he discusses the particular question of whether virtue itself is self-sufficient for 
happiness.
61
  Self-sufficiency was a concept that was closely tied to the Stoic concept of the 
sage and in book three of On Duties Cicero raises this essential point concerning the Stoic 
sage when he states that for them, absolute good is perfect and is only attainable by the wise 
man.
62
 To the Stoics moral goodness is the exclusive property of the sage and it can never be 
separated from virtue, as virtue is the only good, and those who are not considered wise 
cannot be said to have perfect moral goodness, only an appearance of it. The life of the Stoic 
sage would thus, upon initial observation, imply a solitary life, seperated from other men; but 
                                                          
61
 αὐτἁρκη εἶναί πρὀs εὐδαιμονίαν according to Zeno and Chrysippus. 8.127. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the 
Philosophers, ed and trans. by R.D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library, 2 Vols. (Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1972). 
62
 Cicero, De Officiis, 3.3.15. 
25 
 
a life deemed the best, for the Stoics, as it was lived in accordance with Nature.
63
 Yet, in 
another part of the same book, Cicero turns the argument and demonstrates his knowledge of 
the ethical maxim of the Peripatetics, namely, that nature loves nothing solitary, and it strives 
for some support; and man’s best support is his dear friend: ‘Human nature abhors solitude, and 
as always, as it were, leans towards some prop, and the closer the friend, the more pleasant this is’.64 
From the quote above it would appear that there was a contension in thought between the 
Peripatetics and the Stoics in regards to the natural tendency towards friendship, on the one 
hand, and the philosophical notion of the good as being a fully self-sufficient ideal on the 
other. But while the ‘good’ was a fundamental ingredient of the good life however, both these 
schools of thought did differ in what exactly constituted living a good life. The good life 
according to the Stoics is a life lived in agreement with nature.
65
 The natural end was the 
achievement of a life in accordance with reason and thus, for the Stoics, in accordance with 
nature, this was most worthy of choice, itself complete and ultimately self-sufficient. For the 
Peripatetics, however,  it was a life that was not self-sufficient but fully accepted the role that 
external goods played in the achievement of eudaimonia, translated often as ‘happiness’; 
however, a better understanding might render it as ‘living well’, in an ethically fulfilled and 
reasoned life.
66
 The natural end or telos was the designated goal, understood as, that for the 
sake of which everything else was done and what was itself done for the sake of nothing else. 
Happiness then was either an amalgamation of external goods and the utilization of them in 
order to achieve eudaimonia or the life lived in agreement with reason and thus, for the 
Stoics, in agreement with nature, and was most worthy of choice.  
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However, Cicero appears to be asking not so much if happiness as a way of life is 
based solely on virtue, but rather is there a difference between the Peripatetics and the Stoics 
idea of living well, and if so, then which life is the most applicable and beneficial to 
humanity. According to most philosophers, most humans are innately imperfect beings. It 
would take many years of fine education and wise guidance to sculpt, as it were, this 
imperfect reality into perfection. One might attempt to explain this further, by taking as 
examples both Aristotle’s understanding that through the practical use of virtues eventually 
good habits would form, which would in time become second nature, and likewise the Stoic 
process of movement from the initial idea of self-preservation, towards assent to rational 
consent.
67
 These examples are given, merely to point out that both the Stoics and the 
Peripatetics understood that the way to happiness took different paths. The idea was this: 
amongst humanity there were the few and there were the many. The few were called the wise, 
sages and magnanimous. The many called, the herd, the mass/majority, the ignorant and the 
mad. The highest life extolled by Aristotle was that life of contemplation, the philosophical 
life aimed at the impersonation of that life thought godly.
68
 For the Stoics, the sage was very 
much in this mould, for he was a human elevated amongst the many and set as an example 
for them. The Stoic sage was the epitome of the unity of divinity and humanity. Cicero 
describes him as: 
He is the wise man of whom we are in quest, he is the happy man who can think 
no human occurrence insupportable to the point of dispiriting him, or unduly 
delightful to the point of rousing him to ecstasy. For what can seem of moment 
                                                          
67
 The Stoic theory of oikeiosis places the main focus of concern on all life towards its own self preservation and 
that with maturity. This focus of concern will be overtaken by the awaking of the rational mind towards it’s 
natural function, to follow a life lived in accordance with the laws of nature.  
68
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1177a11-1178a8. Happiness being manifested in the action which achieves it, 
this action that Aristotle speaks of is theoria. This activity, when engaged, will elevate man’s life to 
approximately that of a deity. As man is only a man and not a god he must also engage with a life amongst 
others of the human race, even if this life, while affording him both space and time to live a life filled with 
moral action, by and large the happiness from such a life will only be a kin to a second-grade form of happiness. 
27 
 
in human occurrences to a man who keeps all eternity before his eyes and 
knows the vastness of the universe?
69
 
 
And so it was understood that while many might have foolishly wished to aspire to such 
heights as those inhabited by either Aristotle’s magnanimous or good man70 or the Stoic sage, 
few would ever truly realise this as their end. The majority instead were doomed to lead lives 
foolishly content with a sort of secondary understanding.
71
  
Cicero, however, favourably disposed as he was toward Stoic ethics, is highly critical 
of the Stoic notion of an austere and aloof sage; whose happiness is dependent on nothing 
external, and is manifested in his reason and thus, his virtue alone. However in giving 
reference to Aristotle when writing on the naturalness of social inter-relationships Cicero 
argues that nature loves nothing solitary, thus, happiness is not found in solitude and this, 
would put the early Stoics at odds with the Peripatetics. Cicero states this position clearly in 
On Friendship writing that ‘Friendship was given by nature as a helper in virtue, not an 
accomplice in crime, so that, because virtue cannot reach the greatest heights in solitude, it 
should reach them when joined and allied to another’.72 For if nature loves nothing solitary, 
then how can self-sufficiency be called natural. If one admits to the inclusion of external 
goods for the benefit of happiness, then surely it is not self-sufficient, however in following 
this line of reasoning, Cicero warns that if virtue is merely only one of many parts of the 
happy life, needing other parts to make it fully whole, then it must also contest it’s position 
with external influences, and thus be subject to the whims of fortune. As Cicero writes: 
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But if on the other hand virtue lies at the mercy of the manifold and uncertain 
accidents and is the handmade of fortune, and has insufficient strength to 
maintain herself alone, I fear that it seems to follow that in hoping to secure a 
happy life we must not place our confidence in virtue as much as to offer up 
prayers to heaven.
73
 
  
Is self-sufficiency an alien concept and totally impractical when placed into the 
context of the natural constitution of humanity? Where did the ideal of self-sufficiency come 
from? In the world of and after Alexander the Great there was a great shift in the 
philosophical gaze from the focus on the individual within the polis, to the focus on the 
individual within the cosmos.
74
 The political structure of the world in general was ever 
changing, the empires in the West were rising, as that of Alexander was diminishing. Thus, 
this change in focus necessitated a reappraisal of ethical speculation. The pathways to the 
natural end took new directions. Whereas for Aristotle the natural end was found in the 
cultivation of the virtues through active citizenship in the polis, to the Epicureans it was the 
achievement of pleasure and maintenance of tranquillity, and for the Stoics it was a life in 
accordance with nature, itself being equated with a happiness that was self-sufficient, tranquil 
and free from emotional disturbance. All of these philosophical schools saw happiness in 
tranquillity of the mind that would be nurtured to maintain a consistent level of tranquillity 
undisturbed by the changeable winds of fortune. In other words, rejecting totally or regulating 
the influence of external factors (the changeable and often precarious state of daily life for 
many humans) and nurturing inner fortitude (the strength of determined will that shall prevail 
through all struggles).
75
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Stoicism itself flourished in the world after Alexander the Great, and education in the 
Hellenistic period turned Stoic philosophy into a standard component. But just why would 
this be so and what made it so attractive? Stoicism espoused the philosophical idea of the 
union of human reason with that of the divine (in the Stoic sense, not the Judeo-Christian 
sense) and promoted a life of rational consistency. For the Epicureans, however,  the end of 
all actions was to be free from both fear and pain. The pleasurable life was one that promoted 
happiness and distanced itself from aversion. By always seeking to maintain a pleasurable 
existence, humans would live a happy life. This did call for the subject to often remove 
himself from the everyday business of city life, as the life in the city for those in it was often 
filled with opportunities for sadness, pain and fear. Living a life free from pain and amongst 
friends was the best kind of life to live for the Epicureans.
76
 The important point for us to see 
here is that if the world around was always changing, and nothing was certain, then in order 
to never be susceptible to the misery that surely comes with instability one must either reject 
society at large, or turn into himself and fashion himself in the mould of the perfect state, or 
be a God and so strive for a fully self-sufficient life.
77
 
Cicero was vastly effected by the turmoil of politics in the late Republic and with its 
demise the whole world changed for him. With the Republic now demolished, a new political 
state, one of dictators, and soon, emperors, was being constructed in its place. Men like 
Cicero needed to seek a stability, and thus, happiness within, when all around there was 
instability. For if happiness could be taken away at a whim by the vicissitudes of fortune, 
then man needed to look into himself and in particular to that power which could never be 
taken away and which was his alone, in order to find stability. In this stability, both 
tranquillity and later happiness would inevitability flourish. This understanding was not new 
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and could trace its origins back to the Greek philosophical tradition.
78
 Although, Cicero 
admired the Stoics and the notion of the sage
79
, he did see that this ideal was difficult to 
reconcile with the practicalities of human nature. Both Panaetius and his student Posidonious, 
two philosophers from the ‘middle period’ of Stoicism, would help to manifest this 
reconciliation.
80
 These modified the harsh rigidity of the early Stoa and in the process made it 
appealing to the majority of educated Romans.  
It was primarily Panaetius that modified the forbidding doctrine of the early Stoics 
and replaced it with a version that was agreeable to both Cicero and the Romans in general. 
He introduced the acceptable idea of the imperfect progression towards perfection. According 
to Sandbach, Panaetius was not concerned with the ideal sage, but with the actuality of 
human life in all its variety. In rethinking and refashioning his philosophy he also took into 
regard the views of both Plato and Aristotle.
81
 Panaetius also wrote about the problems that 
arise from the exercise of practical duty with that of the obligations of virtue.
82
 Cicero 
develops this point in On Duties, based primarily on a work concerning the same subject by 
Panaetius, highlighting the tension between what is moral and what is expedient.
83
 Panaetius’ 
‘humane’ form of Stoicism was favoured by Cicero, as his own teacher Posidonious of 
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Rhodes was also the pupil of Panaetius. Posidonious continued much in the same way as 
Panaetius, by modifying the doctrines of the early Stoa. Posidonious maintained that the 
passions must be controlled by reason, for the passions were a part of human nature, and 
therefore, natural and not merely ‘mental disturbances’ as the earlier Stoics had speculated.84 
Panaetius and Posidonious attempted to move the focus of Stoicism away from the more 
austere ideas of the early Stoa by adopting ,in turn, a more realistic and pragmatic approach. 
Panaetius argued that reason was the mark of a man and, according to Sandbach, he believed 
that man was the only animal with a sense of order and propriety, which made him fully 
appreciate beauty and order in the world. Posidonious recognised that the passions had their 
cause in the irrational part of the psyche and as such could not be merely reasoned away, as 
though of by the earlier Stoics. Instead, he proposed another way to deal with them.  
Human rational was different from the one shared by the animals and as such was, for 
him, related to the Universal rational. Unhappiness for mankind then, came from not 
following the rational life, or the god inside him, but instead following the dictates of the 
irrational elements within. Therefore and with that in mind, Sandbach writes, Posidonious 
saw that the original maxim of Zeno on the natural end for man necessarily had to be altered. 
He said that mankind must co-operate with nature and the natural order and not just follow it. 
He placed high regard in the aspect of rational choice and also that this would allow for the 
regulation of the irrational, for it was human to be irrational, and not the total disregard or 
extermination of it.
85
 The reformulated telos that Posidonius proposed now stated that the 
natural end was not just to live in agreement with nature, but rather to live ‘in contemplation 
of the truth and order of the universe, cooperating so far as possible in bringing it about, and 
in no way being led by the irrational of the psyche’.86  By living life in this way one might 
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hope to come closer to living the life of the sage. While altering the original maxim of Zeno, 
Posidonious still stressed the harmonization of one’s nature with that of the universe was 
keeping with the dictum of Zeno. Virtue, was still thought of as being essentially part of 
reason, and thus part of nature and sufficient for happiness.
87
 
In the Tusculan Disputations Cicero takes up the argument about virtue being fully 
self-sufficient for happiness. It is just one of the part of the larger discussion that will take 
place in his villa at Tusculum. At the beginning of the book he explains that he is going to set 
out and deal in full with issues that may prove a hindrance to man’s achievement of 
happiness, i.e., fear, death, pains, and emotional disturbances.
88
 Book Five in particular has 
Cicero discussing the question of virtue being sufficient for the happy life, an enquiry which 
Cicero describes as: ‘The topic which brings the greatest glory to philosophy since it teaches 
that virtue is sufficient of itself for the attainment of happiness’.89 By dedicating the contents 
of Book Five of the Tusculan Disputations to resolving the position of virtue as the giver and 
the maintainer of happiness, Cicero is highlighting the argument, that moral goodness is in 
itself the only requisite for a happy life.
90
 For as life’s misfortunes may come to pass the man 
who remains tranquil, circumspect and lets the pursuit of virtue be his guide, will suffer these 
misfortunes gladly, as the strength of soul given by virtue can overcome any of the hazards of 
fortune. Book Five opens with an explanation of the circumstances which have led to the past 
five days of discussions.
91
 While mentioning that he was being inflicted with agony Cicero is 
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referring to the extremely difficult days in which the discussions at Tusculum were written. 
Both privately and publically Cicero was in distress and turned to philosophy.
92
 With the 
death of his beloved daughter Tullia and the dictatorship of Caesar, he is attempting to 
console himself, attempting to give a philosophical explanation of how all of the unhappiness 
that fortuna throws at a man and a country ought to be overcome. It is no mistake that he 
chose to write on these topics straight after giving an exposition of various philosophical 
views of ethics in On Ends. On Ends was highly theoretical and expressed in both clear and 
definite terms the broad philosophical principles on which human conduct should rest.
93
 
Cicero though was certainly not the first one to write on this, as the whole subject of moral 
philosophy was, according to him, developed by Socrates.
94
 
 Socrates related philosophy to both the human condition and ethics, thus formulating 
the idea of humanitas, a threefold division of human nature, in which, when something is 
described as human, then nothing humane is alien to it.
95
 For Cicero, much like Socrates, the 
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most important philosophical question that one might endeavour to answer, was to be found 
in the area morality and ethical behaviour. Why so? Because according to Cicero, philosophy 
was born from a desire to achieve happiness:  
For since this [the question as to whether or not virtue is sufficient for a happy 
life] gave the motive by which those who first devoted themselves entirely in 
the quest for the best condition of life, assuredly it was in the hope of a happy 
life that they bestowed such a wealth of care and toil on its pursuit. 
96
 
 
It was part of the noble effort to pursue a course that was fully engaged in the achievement of 
a happy end. By the labours of the earlier philosophers, virtue has become tied to the happy 
life, in that is is either essential to it, as the Stoics would admit or an essential element in it, as 
the Peripatetics would argue. However, when stating the Peripatetic position, Cicero also 
warns that if virtue is merely only one of many parts of the happy life, needing other parts to 
complete it, then it must also contest its position with external influences and be subjected to 
the whims of fortune. Although for the Stoics, this was plainly not the case, in reaction to the 
frailty of leaving happiness subject to fortune, they pointed out that the happy man being is a 
tranquil man because his tranquillity arises from his virtue.  The unhappy man, however, is 
suffering from mental anguish and his anguish arises not from virtue but from a lack of it, 
Book Three of the Tusculan Disputations, is given over to a discussion of this. In Book Five 
of the Tusculan Disputations, Cicero seemingly aligns himself with the Stoic position by 
maintaining that virtue is self-sufficient and it must be, for it is honourable, and the 
honourable is the only good; however in using both Aristus (the brother of Antiochus and a 
friend of Cicero) and Antiochus to dispute this and argue that happiness admits other goods, 
Cicero is plainly giving an account of the Peripatetic viewpoint: 
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For he (Antiochus) thinks the happy life lies in virtue even if there should be 
some good besides virtue...The arguments used and Antiochus has also stated 
them continually in a number of passages in his works, were that virtue alone is 
of itself able to render life happy and yet not supremely happy.
97
 
 
The above is plainly the view of the Peripatetics as they would state that even the 
most virtuous of men can at times of difficulties suffer the whims of fortune. Virtue can make 
a man happy, but by not admitting external goods he might not be supremely happy. They 
understood that man being subject as he is to both fortune and nature must be comfortable 
with unhappiness. Aristotle gave the example of Priam in reference to this issue
98
 and Cicero 
also gives an example and quotes the Peripatetic Theophrastus, writing about the good man: 
Can I therefore, if I have granted him (Theophrastus) that bodily pains are 
counted evils, that shipwreck of fortune is counted evil, be angry with him when 
he says that not all good men are happy, since the things which he reckons as 
evil can come upon all good men? 
99
 
 
Thus, in accordance with the argument of Theophrastus, it might be said that even the good 
man, when affected by such pains, ills and diseases, will be unhappy. However, Cicero 
rebukes this by repeating the Stoic understanding, that there are no degrees of happiness: ‘For 
I do not understand, for one thing, what the man who is happy wants in order to be happier 
for if anything is to be missing, he is not so much as happy.’100 Cicero at this point reiterates 
the view of Theophrastus, who argued that chance and not sagacity is the ruler of human 
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life.
101
 This is the consistent view of the Peripatetics that fortune directly affects the daily 
lives of humans, controlling both bodily and external goods.
102
 However this comprehension 
of happiness which is subject to fortune is therefore precariously subject to external control 
and factors, and can never provide a firm and stable foundation for happiness. However, 
while this apparent inconsistency can fool the mind of the inexperienced it cannot do the 
same to the mind of the accurately trained. And while it might seem to be logically sound, 
Cicero rebukes those who think so while writing that happiness is not found without but 
within, and happiness is the possession of goodness.
103
 Therefore, whoever is happy can also 
be said to be good, as he possesses that which makes him happy. If this were not the case, 
then one who was completely servile to the whims of fortune would find himself in a very 
unreliable position indeed. Happiness comes from virtue within the body; based in man’s 
rationality. It is not subject to external forces and it is stable when it is nurtured by reason. 
When the Stoic sage can be said to be happy, it is because he has nurtured his reason 
absolutely in accordance with nature. The Peripatetic good man however, seeks happiness 
through the amalgamation of external factors and is able to label virtue as one amongst many 
factors needed for happiness. Therefore, the Peripatetics are admitting that fortune and not 
reason is the guiding light for happiness, proving Theophrastus right.  
However, the Stoic sage will, according to both Cicero and the Stoics, despise 
fortune, and instead seek happiness within his soul. Men must look for philosophy in order to 
perfect their lives, since philosophy leads to perfection. The notion of the soul trained in 
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philosophy is the notion of the perfection of the mind through reason.
104
 This in turn will lead 
to having completeness in reason and so attaining virtue. The sage will be both happy and 
good, happy, as he has attained perfection in rationality and also good, as his happiness is 
maintained by virtue, and virtue is good. It appears that Cicero, the Stoics and the Peripatetics 
might agree on this point.
105
 However, the fundamental question remains: is virtue alone self-
sufficient for the happy life? Stoic ethics assimilated with their understanding of physics, 
understood that human nature was just one part of a whole system in which both the human 
and the divine mind, identified with logos or nature, were united together by reason, hence 
the maxim of Zeno concerning the natural end is a life lived in agreement with nature.
106
 In 
the sage, then, is the man who lived a life with a perfect balance of the two, a man of absolute 
reason and harmony. His reason unified and harmonized with that of the divine made him 
wise, made him virtuous and thus, made him supremely and absolutely happy. But, this idea 
of happiness lay in the negation and disregard of all external factors; happiness becomes a 
personal matter to be nurtured inwardly by virtue in the soul and protected by reason. 
Because of this belief the majority of humanity would live lives in accordance with fleeting 
delusions of  happiness, placing faith in a second rate knowledge, more akin to opinion than 
anything resembling knowledge and being slaves to external control, factors and more 
importantly for the Stoics, ‘fortuna’. This situation and clear difference between the ignorant 
majority and the wise minority was described by Cicero in Book Three of On Duties, when 
he describes the differences between how both view duty: 
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That duty which those same Stoics call ‘right’ is perfect and absolute and 
‘satisfies all the numbers’ as that same school says, and is attainable by none 
except the wise man. On the other hand, when some act is preformed in which 
we see mean duties manifested that is generally regarded as fully perfect, for the 
reason that the common crowd does not, as a rule, comprehend how far it falls 
short of real perfection; but, as far as their comprehension does go, they think 
there is no deficiency.
107
 
        
Here it is apparent that not only is the sage the ideal kind of man but actually more akin to a 
divinity than anything earthly.
108
 However, in placing the sage on a point higher than most of 
the rest of humanity could ever reach, it would seem that the early Stoics were being far too 
idealistic than realistic. How could the Stoics make human happiness possible when if their 
criterion for it is based in absolute reason that only a few or only someone seemingly divine 
could achieve it? This question is something which Panaetius appeared to have understood 
and caused the first to movement away from orthodoxy in Stoicism
109
 by emphasising and 
promoting the practical over the ideal. For Panaetius all men should have their own ideal 
suited to their capacity, rather than an imaginary impossible idea which they should meekly 
and strive towards in maddening dejection.
110
 
Panaetius while infusing Stoic philosophy with elements of Peripatetic philosophy 
made a significant movement away from the early Stoic maxim for happiness by arguing that 
virtue was not wholly self-sufficient for happiness, but rather, things such as health, finances 
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and strength would play a significant role in the happiness that one might hope to achieve.
111
 
By giving this example it is only clearly to show that the admittance of other goods into the 
pantheon of happiness by Panaetius was a pragmatic movement by the Stoics away from the 
ideal maxim of the ‘early’ school, and focused now on the practical reality. The influence of 
Panaetius on Cicero cannot be underestimated.
112
 His thoughts on justice and courage had a 
lot of influence on Cicero as a Roman political figure.
113
 His positive stance on both justice 
and bravery suited those who wanted to be active in political life. This pragmatic approach 
placed a large amount of onus on choice. Correct action was based on circumstances.  A 
change of circumstances may require a change of duty
114
, which itself might sound like an 
appeal to Cicero’s own Academic Sceptic preference of the probable: a change from one 
position to another, as circumstances may require, would involve an act of decision and as 
such an act of choice. But choice implies selection and when the Stoics spoke of choice and 
selection in regard to ethics they divided the selection, external goods, into what was valued 
for a natural, and thus, an ethical life.
115
  
But while external goods could now be selected, when it came to virtue, there was no 
question of selection or rejection. Virtue was on a level of its own and did not come into the 
equation of choice, for it was, equal to being absolutely happy and good considered to be the 
natural end of man.
116
 This onus on choice would place the person into a state of knowing 
what is right to do in any given circumstance because he would have absolute clarity in 
understanding what is right. Sandbach gives the analogy of the king and courtiers to explain 
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the position of virtue in relation to the other things called, ‘preferred’ and ‘indifferent’.117 The 
Stoics viewed all external objects this way. For them virtue itself is exercised by the pursuit 
to obtain that which had value, called ‘preferred’ and by contrast, the avoidance of those 
things thought the contrary. Having good intent in this pursuit was enough as it was 
recognised that extraneous factors outside of man’s control may hinder his achievement of 
those things. A man’s success in selection was measured by his mental attitude to the external 
world, all things belonging to the external world will have differences in value, but they are 
not things that, essentially, will contribute anything to his excellence or his happiness. The 
morally good, virtuous, was to be accepted, the morally bad, vicious, to be shunned. 
Indifferent things were to be chosen or rejected.  It is clear from this that the differences 
between the Stoics and the Peripatetics in ethical understanding are not merely verbal as 
Cicero clearly points out in Book Four of On Ends.
118
 Cicero, through Cato, elucidates the 
reader on this issue: 
Carneades never ceased to contend that on the whole so-called ‘problem of 
good and evil’ there was no disagreement as to the facts between the Stoics and 
the Peripatetics, but only as to terms. For my part, however, nothing seems to 
me more manifest than that there is more of a real than a verbal difference of 
opinion between those philosophers on these points [...]The Peripatetics say that 
all the things which under their system are called goods contribute to happiness; 
whereas our school does not believe that total happiness comprises everything 
that deserves to have a certain amount of value attached to it.
119
 
     
According to the Stoics happiness does not admit of degrees nor does the acquisition 
of externals goods make a man happier, for the Peripatetics it simply does.
120
 Virtue alone 
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can guide man to happiness, regardless of outside factors. What use then, of the indifferent? 
What part, if any, did the idea of things called indifferent play in man’s happiness? With 
regard to the things called indifferent one might look at them in a rather confused way, for if 
the reader were to understand the Stoics correctly, then these ‘things indifferent’ would play 
no part in man’s excellence or happiness. Why then would the Stoics have considered them, 
let alone have given them a place in their moral philosophy? Cicero allows Cato to explain: 
Hereafter an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained 
that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown 
into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task would be found for 
wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that 
pertain to the conduct of life and no choice need be exercised among them.
121
 
 
Indifferent things, then, contribute nothing to happiness and are labelled in two ways: either 
positive or negative. The positive are placed in the same natural order of goodness, though 
placed below it. When choosing amongst these indifferences one must use one’s reason. 
Rationality was everything to the Stoics and the indifferent act as a way of affording the 
person to utilize one’s reason and ultimately one’s virtue. An appropriate action is one that is 
chosen from among the indifferent and in accordance with nature. Since nature endowed man 
with reason, therefore, a life lived in accordance with nature is a rational life. Physics orders 
the universe and order is rational, therefore, the universe is rational. The logos is the guiding 
force in the universe and it was understood that both men and gods shared the same logos. 
Therefore, through the activity of reason, thought of as virtue, man naturally harmonizes his 
nature with that of the universe to achieve happiness.
122
 Stoic physics aids man to 
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comprehend his place in the universe, and so helps him when it comes to choosing from 
among the different options, what is appropriate for right action. Cato explains this as: 
Now an appropriate act is an act so preformed that a reasonable account can be 
rendered of its performance; and this proves that an appropriate act is an 
intermediate thing, to be reckoned neither as a good nor as the opposite. And 
since those things which are neither to be counted among virtues nor vices 
nevertheless contain a factor which can be useful, their element of utility is 
worth preserving.
123
 
 
Any action that was deemed to be appropriate was thus also deemed to be fitting to one’s 
nature
124
 and so the rational man would always naturally choose appropriate action over 
inappropriate ones.
125
 Virtue added both stability and purity to practice. The path to 
happiness was a continuous correction of mistaken beliefs, called mistaken because beliefs 
were false and often based on emotive responses and they had to be judged and therefore, 
necessarily rejected. However, emotions themselves were not thought of as a disease i.e. by 
Panaetius and Posidonious, but merely as a natural part of man’s nature.  Emotive responses 
always had to be appropriate to the given circumstance or situation re. Panaetius
126
 and be 
subject to mental assent.  
The Stoics, in their apparent negation of external goods having anything to do with 
happiness and their elevation of mind as the seat of all happiness would seem to actually be 
going against nature as Cicero himself argues. Cicero rebukes the Stoics arguing that in the 
negation of external goods and the elevation of mind the Stoics show disregard for the real 
things that are according to nature i.e., health, self-preservation, security for external goods. 
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Virtue as being self-sufficient for happiness would seem impractical then, as man is naturally 
not whole self-sufficient. Man has needs external to his own nature, required not only for his 
bodily sustenance and also his rational one. Cicero would justify his rebuke to the Stoic Cato; 
by pointing out that wisdom’s task is to aim at perfecting the whole of man and not just a part 
of it: 
The latter case [the case of a statue not begun by Pheidas, but completed by 
him] resembles the work of wisdom. She did not create man herself, but took 
him over in the rough from nature; her business is to finish the statue that nature 
began, keeping her eyes on Nature meanwhile.
127
 
 
It is natural therefore, according to Cicero, that wisdom’s task is to perfect the whole of man 
and not just one part of it. Although even if absolute perfection is manifested in the most 
noblest part of man, that perfection must not be at the expense of the lower parts of his being. 
This is, for Cicero, exactly what nature does in all things and so a life lived in agreement with 
nature must include perfection of the whole being and not just one part of it, thus the 
harmonization of body and mind into a unity. The Stoic argument then would appear to be 
somewhat inconsistent. For by making virtue self-sufficient for happiness it would appear 
that they dismiss those things that are given by nature to man to only enhance and never 
hinder his life. It might appear that while it is an exercise of virtue to choose or select those 
things that are necessary to make one happy, it is still a virtue to view these things as 
unnecessary for happiness; thus, making it an absolute impossibility. Cicero carries on with 
his refutation by arguing that by placing virtue as fully self-sufficient for happiness, the 
Stoics are following in the mistaken footsteps of a long line of philosophers such as Pyrrho, 
and Aristo, and are again both inconsistent and contradictory: 
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In making the primary objects ‘preferred’, so as to admit a certain principle of 
choice among things, they seem to be following nature, but in refusing to allow 
them to have anything to do with happiness, they again abandon nature.
128
 
 
Cicero writes that Zeno was wrong to make virtue solely self-sufficient and 
responsible for happiness and place no value in external goods. In following Cicero’s 
refutation, it seems contradictory to create or offer selection, when there is no difference 
between any of the goods to be selected, by labelling them ‘indifferent’, at the end of the day; 
Cicero, continuing the argument, points out to Cato that external goods influence our desires 
and motivate moral conduct and in this way they are natural. A life in agreement with nature 
does involve admitting external goods for happiness. Cicero asks, why abandon those schools 
who also admitted this? However, for the Stoics this is precisely the problem, for in accepting 
that external goods/factors play a part in man’s happiness it is giving credence for fortune to 
have a hand in human affairs. The sage will never allow this to happen. For his logos is the 
same as that of the universe and his happiness will depend on that alone, and not on fortune. 
I.G. Kidd explains this further: 
The logos in the universe is the rational element, and therefore the duty of the 
logos in man is the rational element, and therefore the duty of the logos in man 
is the development of his rational part in knowledge, and on knowledge are 
founded all virtues.
129
 
 
Thus, the rationality of man is displayed in virtue and this is the absolute and supreme good. 
For according to Kidd: ‘To contradict this would be to contradict their [Stoic] physics or their 
views on the universe’.130 Fundamentally, to choose rightly is in itself the act of virtue. For as 
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we have seen, virtue being connected to reason makes the virtuous act a rational act, which is 
therefore any act in accordance with nature. The telos might be, ‘to live in agreement with 
nature’, according to Zeno, but as Kidd plainly points out, the Stoics did not hold their 
founding father’s view as either as divine or as ideas eternally held as if written in stone. 
Instead, they would often deconstruct and reconstruct ideas which they considered to be 
wrong and offer a progression of thought in the process.
131
 The way in which the original 
maxim of Zeno on the natural end of man was modified and altered by Chryssipus is a good 
example of this. He reinterpreted the original maxim so that the natural end was understood 
to be a life in accordance with nature rather than the Zeno’s original maxim of the end as life 
in aggreement with nature.
132
 The Chief end of appropriate action would be to act with good 
intent, based in rationality. Cato argues thus in Book Three of On Ends: 
By the exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein 
resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for 
its own sake: and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term 
homologia and we with your approval may call ‘conformity’ inasmuch I say as 
in resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral 
conduct and moral worth itself, which alone is counted as good.
133
 
 
Cato, at this point, appears to be echoing the words of Diogenes of Babylon, the teacher of 
Panaetius, who placed a greater emphasis on the selection and rejection of external objects. 
His subsequent successor, and former student, Antipater of Tharsos continued along this path 
of placing emphasis on selection. This was essentially undertaken in the face of constant 
attack from the arguments of opponents, most notably that of Carneades. This reformation of 
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the relationship of ta kata physin (τἀ κατἀ φὑσιν) and the telos happened because of this 
opposition.
134
 Cicero has Cato fully explain this: 
For though if a man were to make it his purpose to take a true aim with a pear or 
arrow at some mark, his ultimate end, corresponding to the ultimate good as we 
pronounce it, would be to do all he could to aim straight: the man in this 
illustration would have to do everything to aim straight, and yet, although he did 
attain his purpose, his ‘ultimate end’, so to speak, would be what corresponded 
to what we call the Chief Good in the conduct of life, whereas the actual hitting 
of the mark would be in ‘our’ phrase ‘to be chosen’ but not ‘to be desired.
135
 
 
All action would imply a plan, and so, a form of rationality behind it. Man owed his 
superiority over animals to his rationality. This natural superiority also brought with it 
responsibilities that extended not only to the immediate society that man found himself in, 
but for the Stoics to mankind as a whole. Law was the principle guiding-force that mankind 
used to guide and aid its natural responsibilities towards others. As the law on earth was a 
mirrored reflection of the great law of the universe, the natural law. Cicero, in On the Laws, 
argues that law is thought of as natural because we share rationality with the gods. Thus, law 
is equated with the natural good will and feelings of affection towards other men exercised in 
the fellowship of justice.
136
 All earthly law is therefore rooted in nature and is subject to the 
natural law of the universe which is presided over by god. The Epicureans would differ in 
this: they posit a god who does not take part in the affairs of man. For the Stoics human 
beings are all born alike and have a natural tendency and leaning towards developing law, 
logic and justice. Cicero contends that justice is the motive behind all the virtues, not out of 
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fear, but out of the close relationship man has with god.
137
 Philosophy for him is the 
instrument by which all of mankind can recognise and realise that divine element in 
ourselves, that of rationality (logos). By knowing this and by obeying the law, we are 
engaged in the activity of harmonization which will result in us living our lives in accordance 
with nature, and in turn, according to the Stoics will make us both happy and good. The 
highest good then is the expression of the law, and friendship will be the practice of justice. 
Cicero provides an interesting insight into the etymology of ‘law’. He writes that: 
Law is the highest reason, implanted in Nature, which commands what ought to 
be done and forbids the opposite. This reason, when firmly fixed and fully 
developed in the human mind is law. And so they believe that Law is 
intelligence, whose natural function it is to command right conduct and forbid 
wrongdoing. They think that this quality has derived its name in Greek from the 
idea of granting to every man his own, and in our language I believe it has been 
named from the idea of choosing. For as they have attributed the idea of fairness 
to the world law, so we have given it that of selection, though both ideas 
properly belong to Law.
138
 
 
This is interesting because it seems to imply that obedience to the law is a rational act, and 
give credence to the statement above before the quotation. Choice, therefore, is in accordance 
with the laws of nature, and a right choice from among the indifferent was now incorporated 
in the definitions of the end of life.
139
 But are the Stoics being inconsistent with their idea of 
having virtue as self-sufficient for happiness? The concepts of ‘indifferent’ and ‘preferred 
goods’ would appear to be a reaction and compromise in respect to the attacks wrought upon 
the Stoics. Cicero would appear to think so and provides the opinions of Antiochus of 
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Ascalon
140
 in an attempt to further this point of  inconsistency within the Stoic argument in 
relation to the happy life. Cicero contends in many places that according to Antiochus, while 
virtue alone can make life happy it cannot make life supremely happy by and in of itself, 
Cicero writes: ‘The arguments used (and Antiochus has continually stated them in a number 
of passages in his works), were that virtue alone is of itself able to render life happy and yet 
not supremely happy’.141 
However, if this is the case would then happiness admit to degrees? Would the 
addition of external goods move one’s feeling of happiness from a normative state to a 
supreme state of bliss? Cicero attempts to point out by saying that if the addition of external 
goods is to make happiness complete then would the process of addition make one happier, as 
the Peripatetics might say: 
On the Peripatetic theory that there are three kinds of goods, the more 
abundantly supplied a man is with bodily or external goods, the happier he is; 
but it does not follow that we Stoics can accept the same position, and say that 
the more a man has of those bodily things that are highly valued the happier he 
is. For the Peripatetics hold that the sum of happiness includes bodily 
advantages, but we deny this altogether.
142
 
 
 Stoic happiness did not admit of degrees and certainly did not admit external goods but then, 
in making happiness rely solely on being virtuous and seeing everything else as indifferent or 
preferred, did the Stoics make happiness invulnerable and thus, unattainable? Cicero also 
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seems to have this in mind when he addresses this issue;
143
 however, the answer to this is that 
according to the Stoics this might seem absurd, as only virtue is self-sufficient for happiness 
and admits to no degrees; happiness is then consistent with man’s reason, ever flourishing as 
he flourishes in reasoned bliss, the so-called life in agreement with nature. Cicero writes 
openly of the erroneous nature of the philosophies holding that virtue is the sole good, but 
shows that while the Stoics do follow nature, they then appear to abandon it. He goes further 
in his refutation to say that essentially Zeno differed from his predecessors in only language 
rather than anything of real substance.
144
 Pupius Piso, Cicero writes, would ridicule the Stoics 
over this.
145
 The Stoics are caught up in their paradoxes, which for Cicero, are plainly truisms 
and nothing more, and would not hold any kind of weight when put under scrutiny. They look 
at vices and label all equally abhorrent but for Cicero this is ridiculous as the nature of the 
object and circumstance that make all the difference when deciding on how to judge and view 
something. Thus, all vices are not the same, prudence will aid man in understanding this fact:    
For the virtue known generally as prudence is an attribute as we hold of all the 
arts, and every master craftsman in each branch of art ought to possess it. Hence 
the proof also of the equality of transgression breaks down.
146
 
 
For Cicero the Stoics are attempting, albeit badly, to maintain two contrary opinions 
at once.
147
 Wisdom must give equal merit to the lower body just as much as it allows for the 
precedence of mind over the body. For just as nature works in a system that includes all and 
excludes nothing, so too then must both mind and body share equal importance. The main 
point of Antiochus in Book Five of On Ends, is that the Stoics do not permit any value to 
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happiness of the body, only as a concept born in the mind. But if the body suffers ills would it 
not affect the mind? It would appear that even the Stoics who dismiss external evils and pain 
as an indifferent must admit that it is of concern even to the wise man if his body is racked 
with pain and he suffers ills however the Stoic position, again, is that even bodily and 
external goods are not eclipsed by mental goods, and even if they were, they ought to still be 
included in the list as those preferred in accordance with nature and so:  
Man, [Chrysippus] so classified as to make the mind the principle part in him; 
and yet he so defined man’s End as to make it appear, not that he is principally 
mind, but that he consists of nothing else. But the only case in which it would 
be correct to place the Chief Good in virtue alone is if there existed a creature 
consisting solely of pure intellect, with the further proviso that this intellect 
possessed nothing of its own that was in accordance with nature, as bodily 
health is. But it is impossible even to imagine a self consistent picture of what 
such a creature would be like.
148
 
 
       
The instinct of self-preservation must pertain to the whole of man. Not just the seat of reason 
or the body but to every aspect of his being. For such is the meaning of self-preservation. The 
Stoics believed that logos was found to dwell in all of the universe. It permeated every single 
part of human nature, physical and rational. The duty of the logos was to assist in the 
perfection of man as a whole. The Stoic notion of self-preservation is important to 
understand, as the Stoics did place emphasis on social duties. This awareness of one’s own 
constitution is found also in both plants and animals. A being should accept what was 
beneficial to its constitution and reject what was harmful or obstructionist to its natural 
development. Labelling the primary concern being self-preservation was not in universal 
agreement among all of the philosophical schools, for instance it went against to the 
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teachings of the Epicureans who had their own theories on the primary instinct.
149
 Nature for 
the Stoics is endowed with logos and this is exhibited in both the structure and the rational or 
ordered activity of everything that dwells in it. For nature teaches us to take care of our lives 
during our lifetime. Nature is the best guide to good living. It informs us of our duties. All 
natural inclinations come from this understanding, that in order to live a good and happy life 
we must conform to the law of nature. The gods, being truly wise, are active in the governing 
of the world and they are united in a commonwealth of community and friendship. Human 
beings share the gift of rationality with the gods and as such human law has been derived 
from divine law. Human reason is a microcosm of the divine, which rules over the universe 
with sagacity: 
Since we possess wisdom, reason and prudence, the gods must needless possess 
them too in greater perfection, and not possess them merely but also exercise 
them upon matters of the greatest magnitude and value; but nothing is of greater 
magnitude and value than the universe; it follows therefore that the universe is 
governed by the wisdom and providence of the gods.
150
  
  
In the sharing of rationality with the divine, man will in turn look to those who also 
possess rationality with affection. This affection for rationality is thought endowed by nature 
and Cato Book Three of On Ends, attempts to give credence to this fact: 
It is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in 
parent’s affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to 
which we trace the origin of the human race in communities.
151
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Clearly demonstrated by Cato this affection has its origins in parental affection towards their 
children. Nature has given both man and woman the means to procreate, and therefore, it is 
natural to show affection towards offspring. Cato says that in animals this can be seen quiet 
openly. Humanity has been predesigned to form and live in union and societies. Philanthropy 
is thus created by nature and a common love for all of humanity is in accordance with natural 
law.
152
 This can be further understood within the context of oikeiosis
153
 according to Cicero, 
referring to the doctrine as understood by Panaetius, in Book One of On Duties.
154
 While 
both animals and man share in this, it is reason, which demarcates man from the brutes, 
orders man’s life and gives his relationships with other human beings a purpose: ‘nature 
likewise, by the power of reason, associates man with man in the common bonds of speech 
and life; she implants in him above all, I may say, a strange tender love for his offspring.’155 
So Oikeiosis is understood to be the way in which a Stoic might rationaly understand his 
place in the world. Human beings shared rational existence in the cosmos with the gods, 
which was understood by most Stoics as a cosmopolis. The cosmopolis was labelled such a 
thing as it was the place where both the moral and political organisation and government of 
mankind and of the universe was enacted.  It was the ideal state for the Stoics, as all humans 
are born with reason and thus, the capability of virtue, they would naturally be citizens of the 
cosmopolis. In On the Laws, Cicero writes: 
In fact there is no human being of any race who, if he finds a guide, cannot 
attain virtue...inasmuch as these considerations prove to us that the whole 
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human race is bound together in unity, it follows, finally, that knowledge of the 
principles of right living is what makes men better.
156
 
  
Thus, in the cosmopolis men are united by virtue and common good will. Posidonious 
is reported to have compared the Roman Empire with this notion of a cosmopolis.
157
 Equality 
and fellowship is advocated within the cosmopolis, because as it will have reason as its 
foundation then it will naturally also have a foundation in morality. The natural law promotes 
this harmony of equality and Cicero writes in Book Three of On Duties that the single law of 
nature is not to harm anyone.
158
 Justice which binds men together in ethical reasoning is akin 
to friendship. In Book One of On the Laws Cicero explains how justice and friendship are 
natural and both arise out of man’s virtue. However, in Book Three of On Ends, Cato says 
that even though friendship is natural, and the wise man will hold his friends’ interests as 
dear as his own, it is still classified by the Stoics as among the things ‘preferred’: They 
recommend the cultivation of friendship, classing it among ‘things beneficial’.159 Though it 
appears that there is still some ambiguity as to what the Stoics mean by this. Friendship 
would appear natural to man, and according to the Stoics the social duty is natural. Therefore, 
would man’s oikeiosis not also include his friends? In Book Three of On Ends Cicero 
develops the notion of two versions or types of oikeiosis: the first as already mentioned which 
is a primary impulse towards self-preservation; and the second which is an impulse towards 
the social community. For Cicero, adults have two approaches towards bonding: the first 
from nature which is inherent and is exemplified by animals caring for their young; the other 
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is found in rationality and this, is anchored in the divine principle. Socialization can be said to 
be fundamental to human nature, because it is seen to be a part of the natural process of a 
child’s natural development. When the baby is born it will look to form a bond with its 
parents, even before it has full use of its rational capacities. Parenthood then is part of nature 
and thus, in accordance with the natural law. The relationship between both parents and their 
children entails the notion of care for other social beings. The sociability of human beings is 
weighted in divine reason and will as it is a product of both divine reason and will. It is 
natural to prefer common advantage to our own. Politics and family life are seen as a duty
160
 
by Cato in On Ends:  
The wise man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to 
live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have 
children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible 
with the character of the Stoic sage.
161
 
      
Therefore, in conclusion, while the Stoic sage may have a family and enjoy 
friendships, it will only be up to a point that he will let these affectionate bonds enter into his 
life. As a man of perfect virtue he will be happy not because of what the world brings to him 
in the shape of his friends and familial relationships, but by what he brings to it. Virtue alone 
is self-sufficient for happiness and at times, the Stoic argument has been extremely 
persuasive. But, Cicero, through his own refutations and also those of the Peripatetics, allows 
for equally persuasive counter arguments. The philosophical concept of virtue being self-
sufficient for happiness would appear to be inconsistent with a reality shared by most of 
humanity. The Peripatetic one, which admits external goods, would seem far more adequate 
to the human condition. If indeed, self-sufficiency was solely responsible for man’s happiness 
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then what use of friendship? The self-sufficient man will be able to self cultivate his own 
happiness and not be subject to the vicissitudes of fortune that may befall others who appear 
actively reliant on others. A movement away from the apparent austere maxim of the early 
Stoics would appear to be much more fitting for humanity. While the Stoics wanted to 
emphasize social duties, and the cosmopolis they were equally comfortable to deny that social 
interaction could have any importance with a man’s happiness. In trusting to the ideal, one 
might ask if their concept of friendship just an ideal? What kind of friendship would the sage 
have? Based on mere rationality and lacking in emotion? For ultimately happiness 
encompasses all of human being not just in the mind. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HAPPINESS: FROM SELF-SUFFICIENCY IDEALLY TO FRIENDSHIP 
NATURALLY 
 
At the very beginning of Laelius On Friendship Cicero sets out the questions for his enquiry. 
These questions concern in particular the nature of friendship and also the rules governing its 
application.
162
 These questions are worthy of consideration because the very nature of 
friendship itself is, by all standards, closely linked with human nature. As we have seen in the 
last chapter, the Stoics, especially the earlier members of the school, had a particular opinion 
on human nature. But the members of the middle period and the Roman period appended 
their ideas to earlier ones. In many ways, Cicero’s questions are related to his discussion of 
oikeiosis, because as we shall see, the theory of oikeiosis involves the parallel evolution of 
man’s social and rational nature. Self-sufficiency as a key component of happiness was to 
become less and less important in Stoicism. That is not to say that it was completely pushed 
aside or regarded as completely redundant. Happiness during the middle period in Stoic 
philosophy and in particular the Roman period, relied more on social inter-action and less on 
imitation of the austere and self-sufficient sage. Friends were a cause for concern to the 
critics of Stoic moral philosophy
163
, purely because of the intransigence of the Stoics ethical 
outlook. For the Stoics would say that the good man has no need of friends, yet at the same 
time also say that friendship was counted amongst the virtues, and thus, in accordance with 
nature.  
This seemed on our first reading to be a contradiction. For Cicero, however, the 
answer to this issue was to be found in the nature of friendship itself and the importance of 
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the role it played in human affairs. In the first part of this thesis I discussed just how the 
Stoics of the middle period namely Panaetius and Posidonius, altered the maxims of the 
earlier Stoics and sculpted a less austere and far more humane version.
164
 But why would the 
Stoics of the middle period have felt the need to adjust the focus of the older Stoa, from 
looking upward, in a sense, towards the ideal sage, to a more down to earth, and realistic 
view? A statement from Cicero in On Duties concerning the probable views of Panaetius is 
revealing in this matter: 
Now the men we live with are not quiet perfect and ideally wise, but men who 
do very well, if there be found in them but the semblance of virtue. I therefore 
think that this is to be taken for granted, that no one should be entirely neglected 
who shows any trace of virtue.
165
 
      
Cicero’s statement is very interesting because it would appear to show and demonstrate the 
acceptance of the mass of humanity by the Stoics as having the possibility of acquiring virtue, 
and not just being sidelined and being labelled insane. In this, the idealistic view is altered 
and replaced with an acceptance of a more realistic vista. The early Stoics thought that the 
wise man was a wholly self-sufficient man, because he was more akin to a divinity than an 
ordinary human being, as his wisdom was far superior to any around him. He was thought 
superior in wisdom because the sage has a completely universal understanding of truth, not 
just the particular version of it that most other human beings have.
166
 However, by placing 
the sage in a position where he is akin to a god, how could the early Stoics portray him as 
being an actual part of the human race, which they disregarded as the insane majority? An 
examination of how the Stoics understood the concept of Nature could provide an answer. 
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For rather than just merely having one so called ‘universal human nature’ there were in fact 
two roles assigned to it as Cicero in On Duties was clear to point out: 
 
We must realise also that we are invested by Nature with two characters, as it 
were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our being all alike 
endowed with reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute. 
From this all morality and propriety are derived, and upon it depends the 
rational method of ascertaining our duty. The other character is one that is 
assigned to individuals in particular.
167
 
 
The above statement does appear to be a break, of sorts, from the early Stoics in their attitude 
towards the wise man and the rest of humanity. When attacked and criticised over this,the 
Stoics, in turn, had to defend their idealistic stance on the matter.
168
 However, in following 
Chrysippus, Panaetius drew a clean distinction between the sage and the progressives
169
, this 
would appear to have been a move born from necessity more than anything else. Since, by 
dividing humanity into two categories, the wise and the foolish, coupled with the fact that 
their earlier ethical theory was totally intransigent the Stoics were seen as being completely 
unpractical, a criticism that appears to have necessitated practical compromise. Panaetius was 
now able to say that all people were born with the ability to be virtuous, and even those who 
were though ‘bad’ had the ‘likeness’ of virtue in them. Their term for this immoral majority 
rather than the moral minority was phauloi, meaning more inferior than anything particularly 
wicked
170
, when compared to the wise, thought both superior and virtuous. In this 
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categorisation of inferior dwelt the progressives, those who were progressing or evolving, as 
it were, from inferiority to superiority.  
By placing emphasis on the progressives the Stoics (Chrysippus, Panaetius) were 
themselves progressing and navigating a different direction in ethical education, a departure 
from their predecessors, who placed emphasis on the imitation of the wise man. It was 
accepted that anyone with the semblance of virtue could be educated in the attainment of 
moral perfection. Now through both practice and habituation in virtuous  behaviour, the 
individual could morally progress, thus allowing the individual to become perfect in virtue 
and in character. By both softening their stance of the intransigency of their maxims and in 
recognising that although people are fallible they still were capable of gaining moral 
perfection, the Stoics of the middle period managed to make the school one of the most 
successful and subsequently most popular in the Hellenistic world. Cicero mentions the  
attitude of Panaetius in relation to this in Book One of On Duties, writing that conduct must 
be in accordance with individual endowments, not in accordance with nature per se: 
For we must so act as not to oppose the universal laws of human nature, but, 
while safeguarding those, to follow the bent of our own particular nature [...] 
For it is of no avail to fight against one’s nature or to aim at what is impossible 
of attainment.
171
 
 
By emphasising the shift from the universal nature to a particular one, Cicero is illustrating 
the movement that actively encouraged the individual to make his own path in the world and 
to a lesser extent aim at what is too high to achieve, the personifaction of the sage. 
Individuals would take responsibility for their own actions and also engage with others 
around them.   
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In On Duties Cicero places a great emphasis on the proper functions that are made 
subject specific to the individual qualities that every person has.
172
 Individual responsibility 
now superseeding imitation and Cicero echoes Panaetius in these sentiments and speaks of 
the roles that one must play in an attempt to distinguish and understand different lifestyles 
and careers. He refers to everyone having four roles, the first role one is in reference to the 
universal nature of rationality that is shared by all human beings, and the second one referring 
to the physical, mental and lastly the temperamental nature of every individual human being. 
The third and fourth roles will distinguish and clarify : ‘the entirely accidental determinants 
of personal identity from the career and specializations people choose for themselves’.173 
Cicero proposes that the latter roles be in agreement with the former ones and thus, sets out a 
guideline for how all persons should act and shape their lives: 
If there is any such thing as propriety at all, it can be nothing more than uniform 
consistency in the course of our life as a whole and all its individual actions. 
And this uniform consistency one could not maintain by copying the personal 
traits of others and eliminating one’s own [...] if we take this into consideration, 
we shall see that it is each man’s duty to weigh well what are his own peculiar 
traits of character, to regulate these properly, and not to wish to try how another 
man’s would suit him [...] Everyone, therefore, should make a proper estimate 
of his own natural ability and show himself a critical judge of his own merits 
and defects [...] We shall, therefore, work to the best advantage in that role to 
which we are best adapted. But if at some time stress of circumstances shall 
trust us aside into some uncongenial part, we must devote to it all possible 
thought, practice, and pains, that we may be able to perform it, if not with 
propriety, at least with as little impropriety as possible [...] To the two above-
mentioned characters is added a third, which some chance or some circumstance 
imposes, and a fourth also which we assume by our own deliberate choice [...] 
but what role we ourselves may choose to sustain is decided by our own free 
choice [...] Above all we must decide who and in what manner of men we wish 
to be and what calling in life we would follow, and this is the most difficult 
problem in the world.
174
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This quote is clearly illustrative of the position that Cicero is taking at this point. He contends 
that individuals have the power to shape their lives, and this contention will also place 
importance in the role of external circumstances. These four roles described above give a 
general view of the considerations people will have to think about when they are deciding on 
the right action to take in the course of their lives. Cicero stresses the importance of personal 
responsibility in making decisions; this itself reads as marked change in direction from the 
early Stoics who placed the sage as the focus of imitation. This change in direction brought 
Stoicism in a sense, down to earth. Panaetius now placed a stress on agreement between 
man’s individual capacities and that of his general nature, unlike Chrysippus’ idea of 
agreement between universal nature and human nature.
175
                
Thus, it would appear that the idea of self-sufficiency was no longer a viable pre-
requisite for happiness. In On Duties, Cicero begins almost at once to place emphasis on the 
social aspect of man’s nature, what he ought to do, his duty. He describes two types of duties: 
firstly, the intermediate duties called common or average action (medium commune 
officium),and secondly, the correct, perfect or absolute duties (perfectum officium rectum), 
the latter are only preformed by the sage, the former by humanity: 
We distinguish between ‘mean’ duty, so called, and ‘absolute’ duty. Absolute 
duty we may, I presume, call ‘right’, for the Greeks call it κατόρθωμα, while the 
ordinary duty they call καθῆκον. And the meaning of those terms they fix thus: 
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whatever is right they define as ‘absolute’ duty, but ‘mean’ duty, they say, is 
duty for the performance of which a probable reason may be rendered.
176
 
 
Rackham, in his translation notes in On Ends, makes a point that Cicero’s rendering of 
officium for the Greek kathέkon is somewhat problematic. In rendering it as such, what is 
understood is that the individual will as an adult choose from a selction of natural goods, 
which as a child he persured instinctively. Cicero labels this as a duty or obligation. However, 
by putting selction with duty it would appear that Cicero is giving an inaccurate translation of 
Zeno’s original meaning of the word for ‘appropriate action’. It would appear that by making 
acts towards self-preservation a duty when they are originally meant as a rational choice and 
decision, Cicero is giving an inaccurate translation.
177
 By stating this at an early stage in the 
dialogue one can read that man’s social nature is extremely important to the middle Stoics 
and therefore, draw the conclusion that the idea of self-sufficiency plays a smaller role in the 
happy life of man. However, Cicero does make the point in On Duties and also in On 
Friendship, that virtue is that which unites the two concepts: self-sufficiency and happiness. 
The essential constituents needed for friendship are found in virtue and this has parallels with 
his treatment of duty.  Laelius in On Friendship says that society is the tie that binds
178
, and 
Cicero in On Duties argues that society is the thing which links mankind.
179
 Further on this 
                                                          
176
 Ibid., 1.8: Nam et medium quoddam officium dicitur et perfectum. Perfectum officium rectum, opinor, 
vocemus, quoniam Graeci κατόρθωμα, hoc autem commune officium καθῆκον vocant. Atque ea sic definiunt, ut, 
rectum quod sit, id officium perfectum esse definiant; medium autem officium id esse dicunt, quod cur factum 
sit, ratio probabilis redid posit. 
177
 See, Cicero, De Finibus, 3.20, p.238. Notes from the translator. Rackham is merely stating what has been by 
or large already known to Ciceronian Scholars namely that when attempting to render Greek words and 
philosophical terms into Latin, Cicero often had to reflect on the fact that he was writing mainly for a Roman 
readership and so had to take Roman cultural and social considerations into his attempts at rendering. Rackham 
,with this in mind, is therefore correct in mentioning the problems with the Ciceronian translations here.  
178
 Cicero, De Amicitia, 20: Quanta autem vis amicitiae sit, ex hoc intellegi maxime potest, quod ex infinita 
societate generis humani quam conciliavit ipsa natura, ita contracta res est adducta in angustum, ut omnis 
caritas aut inter duos aut inter paucos iungeretur. 
179
 Cicero, De Officiis, 1.22: In hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi, communes utilitates in medium afferre 
mutatione officiorum, dando accipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devincire hominum inter 
homines societatem. 
63 
 
point, Cicero writes in On Duties
180
 and in On Friendship that both friendship and bonds of 
human society are in accordance with nature: 
For this reason it seems to me that friendship originates in nature, rather than in 
need: more because of an attachment of the mind, accompanied by the sense of 
affection, than because of a calculation of the amount of advantage that the 
association will bring.
 181 
 
Describing the feeling of attachment and affection that friendship brings, it appears that 
Cicero is describing the Stoic notion of oikeiosis.
182
 In Book Three of On Ends Cicero 
through Cato describes oikeiosis as the theory which:  
Immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living 
creature feels an attachment to itself and to feel affection for its own 
constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution [...] In 
proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their 
health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure 
or pain; this would be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own 
constitution and were afraid of destruction [...] this leads to the conclusion that 
it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action [...] the first 
‘appropriate act’ (for so I render the Greek  καθῆκον) is to preserve oneself in 
one’s natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in 
accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary.
183
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By understanding oikeosis as such the Stoics illustrated their understanding that the 
first instinct of human nature was that of self-preservation. The idea of self-preservation is 
the primal instinct given by nature to the child at birth. Consciousness is the awareness of 
one’s own constitution, understanding that one has a duty towards oneself at the beginning, 
Diogenes Laertius citing Chrysippus writes that: 
  
They say [The Stoics] that an animal has self preservation as the object of its 
first impulse, since nature from the beginning appropriates it, as Chrysippus 
says in his On Ends book one. The first thing appropriate to every animal, he 
says, is its own constitution and the consciousness of this. For nature was not 
likely to alienate the animal itself, or to make it and then neither alienate it nor 
appropriate it. So it remains to say that in constituting the animal, nature 
appropriated it to itself. This is why the animal rejects what is harmful and 
accepts what is appropriate.
184
 
 
This view of the first instinct of human nature, was at definite odds with the Epicurean 
one.
185
 For the Stoics life was a constant state of rational evolution. By this one can say that 
when the child had first learned to accept and appropriate those things necessary to its self-
preservation, it would then naturally ascend to become a fully rational being in adulthood. 
Rational life was strictly the possession of human beings and the exercise of rationality would 
be considered as an act of virtue. In the harmonization of reason human beings will see 
rationality in all humans beings, the sense of shared rationality amongst human beings will in 
turn lead to a natural concern towards others. Oikeosis would encompass this idea within its 
definitions. 
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Oikeosis is described as the Stoic notion of the relationship that the self has with itself 
and it is grounded in the world in which it inhabits.
186
 In On Duties, Cicero writes of the 
characteristics that construct the identity of the human being. When describing the virtues he 
describes temperance as decorum.
187
 He furthers his description by breaking decorum into 
two parts, one general and the other particular. General decorum corresponds with human 
dignity and shows that human nature is superior to that of the brutes. Particular decorum is 
concerned with the social aspect of man, being able to speak and act well in public. With 
moral decorum nature is evidently assigning man his role in life, to be both self-controlled 
and also considerate to others. In this way decorum prescribes two duties to man: the first is 
to follow nature and the second is to subject the passions to reason. In doing this Cicero is 
making it clear that a life in accordance with nature is a rational one, but also one that is 
considerate of others
188
 Reason and society are thus, naturally interconnected. It is natural 
that humans need others; this is shown initially in children’s reaction and affection towards 
their parents. But Oikeiosis, in my understanding, is the Stoic attempt to illustrate the 
evolution of their ethical view and the reality of daily life, and it is important to understand 
this process as an evolution. Oikeiosis ascends and evolves because human nature does the 
same thing, as the need of human beings change over time, so too will their oikeiosis. In this 
rational ascendency man will learn to use his reason to choose amongst the things that nature 
shall offer him. But in this process of selection man will see that people with whom he has a 
bond are not amongst the indifferent but amongst the things preferred. This means that 
friendship or kinship is to be preferred from amongst the classes of the indifferent because 
                                                          
186
 G. Raymond-Schils, The Roman Stoics, Self, Responsibility, and Affection (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 16-18. 
187
 Cicero, De Officiis, 1.93-100.  
188
 Ibid.,  2.9-10. 
66 
 
these are more in accordance with nature. Man needs these things so his human nature might 
develop properly.
189
  
Cicero has already been speaking of oikeiosis when he describes man’s duty as duty 
which is explicitly linked with his service to his society. Man’s duty, as understood by 
Cicero, will entail his acting in accordance with nature, which is any action, that is, orderly, 
appropriate and temperate, while having an ascetic sense of things both earthly and divine.
190
 
Man’s sense of duty arises out of his social nature and is a natural part of it. The Stoics 
counted relationships such as the ones that a man forms with those around him and in turn his 
society at large as part of his rational evolution. The social oikeiosis and the oikeiosis to one’s 
self are developed parallel to each other. However, in the course of this process of maturity 
the human being will not lose his capacity for self-preservation, but instead subjugate it to the 
life of reason.
191
 Oikeiosis is fundamentally important in our discussion of friendship, as this 
explains man’s natural rational evolution which places importance in social affection. It is 
rational for us to have affection for those in our social circle, and even the sage must admit to 
these natural social links. This might seem absurd in the light of our discussion about the self-
sufficiency of the sage eariler. Yet, as we have seen, the Stoics did alter their philosophical 
theories in the face of criticism in the years after Zeno, and many of the Stoics did appear to 
progress from a more intransigent position, e.g., Aristo of Chios
192
, to a much more moderate 
position, e.g., Panaetius, as has already been shown. Human rational development was 
essentially embedded in human social nature and they saw that duty towards a family, friends 
and country was absolutely in following a life in accordance with nature: 
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The Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to 
live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have 
children by her. Even the passions of love when pure are not thought 
incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage.
193
 
 
We see the same explanation in On Friendship, where the source of friendship is love and 
affection found in good will.
194
  It is through friendship that man will learn to have a natural 
sense of equality and fairness towards others.
195
 Man is not just a rational being; he has a 
teleological grounded sense of socialization and a commitment to others.
196
 This is essential 
to the perfection of man’s nature. Man will therefore find perfection by being a member of a 
community of gods and men: ‘Again they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it 
is a city or state of which both men and gods are members and each one of us is a part of this 
universe.’197 
Cicero also discusses this issue in On the Nature of the Gods
198
; friendship is itself 
found in both affection for and concord with the community at large.  For Cicero like the 
Stoics and Aristotle, one of the defining features of true friendship is total concord between 
the friends. If concord between friends is a mark of true friendship for Cicero through Laelius 
then one of the distinguishing features of the inferior sort of friendship is discord between 
friends. This is easy to see as when differences arise between people engaged in the inferior 
and common sort of friendship, then one of the fundamental laws pertaining to true friendship 
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has been broken and thus, the friendship cannot be said to be either true or continue to exist. 
Cicero speaking through Laelius says that: 
If some change of character or interests takes place, as it often does, or if friends 
are separated by a political disagreement (I am now talking, as I said just now, 
not about the friendships of the wise, but about ordinary ones), one will need to 
be careful to avoid the impression that one has not only ended a friendship, but 
also a quarrel.
199
 
 
Cicero maintains that the good will know why they are friends, whereas the common sort of 
friendship it will be guided by opinion more than true knowledge. Hence a difference of 
opinion may well led to quarrling among the common mass. The friendship of the good, is 
based on virtue and so is stable and by having concord both parties will never quarrel, for 
friendship can only exist in virtue.
200
 So the wise will know why they are friends and also 
that the affection that they share and give to one another is completely natural. Likewise they 
will comfort each other in sorrow: ‘ And it is a true saying that, to fullfill the requirements of 
friendship, one must eat many bags of salt together’.201 Oikeiosis, again, gives an insight into 
this.  As the individual matures into adulthood and a rational being as theorized and described 
in oikeiosis, it will be natual that rational beings observe other rational beings as objects of 
both love and affection.
202
  
Love and friendship is not only an intimate personal matter but it also a social and 
political one. For the Stoic system was one of unity and so their theories of friendship 
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extended into political arena and their political theories thus, were closely aligned with their 
theories of duty,  friendship and also oikeiosis. The good man was considered a man who 
took his duty to his society seriously and by doing so he would create harmony between men.  
The idea of the law involves being able to distinguish from what is just and what is unjust. 
This will take wisdom and the ability to be always able to choose what is just and what is 
true.
203
 Hence the good man would be the one who could and would create harmony among 
men. Justice and law are derived from human nature
204
 in which the mind is ascendent and 
thus, in complete accord with the universal law. For the Stoics all the virtues were as one, 
complied into a unity of virtues.
205
 As virtue was located in rationality, and anything that 
participated in rationality was identified with goodness. Hence, one might say that just as 
prudence is rooted in rationality, so is justice, and therefore, it is a virtue. J.Harris adds 
weight to this theory and writes that justice is a virtue because: ‘Justice and law were not 
matters of opinion but fixed in nature and were worth persuing as an absolute good’.206 So 
justice is a natural extension of oikeiosis.  Cicero, through Cato, explains that this care for 
others in the community is natural and altruistic behaviour exhibited by all animals in nature 
and man is not different: 
Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be 
born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and 
cherished. Even in the lower animals nature’s operation can be clearly 
discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing 
their young, we seem to be listening to the voice of nature. Hence it is manifest 
that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from 
nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. From this 
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impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unties human beings 
as such; this is also bestowed by nature.
207
 
      
In observing how animals live according to nature, man would know what he ought to do, as 
human beings are also social, and thus naturally altruistic. Rationality itself is consistent and 
therefore, any action in accordance with rationality will be consistent and thus, good; 
altruistic behaviour is said to be natural because it is found throughout the natural world, so it 
is also good. In On Duties, Cicero also discusses this issue
208
, but adding that due to mankind 
possessing reason, human altruism goes beyond merely rearing of one’s young and also 
includes the care of one’s society. For man is not motivated merely out of self-interest (this 
would go against reason and nature) but rather, also by a natural impulse towards other 
humans with whom man identified with.
209
 So one’s natural duty is to the care of one’s 
society. there can be no differentiation between the interests of the individual and that of 
society. Therefore, natural law and justice go hand in hand with rational behaviour, and thus, 
with wisdom.
210
 This is in contrast to injustice which is the disrupter of union and friendship; 
Cicero develops these points in On Duties: 
This then ought to be the chief end of all men, to make the interest of each 
individual and the whole body politic identical. For, if the individual 
appropriates to selfish ends what should be devoted to the common good, all 
human fellowship will be destroyed. And further, if Nature ordains that one man 
shall desire to promote the interests of a fellow-man, then it follows, in 
accordance with that same Nature, that there are interests that all men have in 
common.
211
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In relation to the above passage, the theory of oikeiosis would show that law is a product of 
reason, and therefore, provides man with moral imperatives. When the Stoics developed their 
theories about the cosmopolis, they were theorising about a universal city of the fair-minded 
and good, which is itself based in reason and partakes fully of natural law. Cicero, in On the 
Nature of the Gods argues that the only criterion for entry to the cosmopolis is wisdom and 
virtue: ‘For the world is as it were the common dwelling-place for gods and men, or the city 
that belongs to both; for they alone have use of reason and live by justice and by law’.212 
Friendship or fellowship is mentioned as one of the duties for the wise men who dwell 
in the cosmopolis, for in friendship, the wise will act together, undertaking beneficial acts by 
which all of the virtues will be brought to their natural fulfilment. Thus, the cosmopolis is 
truly united and maintained in virtue.
213
 By assigning true friendship a place amongst the 
virtues, for only the wise can truly know it, the Stoics are saying that it is in absolute 
accordance with nature. It is therefore united with justice and all the other virtues and appears 
to be the motivating factor in uniting men and gods alike. In On Friendship Laelius argues 
that there are two kinds of friendship: Friendship of the wise, a higher form of friendship, 
only practiced amongst the wise, and a lower form of friendship, practiced amongst the 
common mass. Cicero has Laelius describe these type of ‘friendships’ as the incomplete sort 
on the one hand and true and perfect on the other. Referring to them in passage twenty two of 
On Friendship as: ‘I speak now not of the common or incomplete sort (of friendship) […] but 
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about the true and perfect friendship that is found among the few who are remembered for 
it.’214  
In introducing this distinction Cicero is following in the footsteps of Panaetius and he also 
gives an answer to the question concerning friendship and the self-sufficient sage.  He calls 
this the community of interests:  
For friendship is in fact nothing other than a community of views on all matters 
human and divine, together with goodwill and affection; and I am not sure if the gods 
have given men any better gift than this, leaving aside wisdom.
215
  
 
This statement appears to echo the Stoic understanding that friendship was maintained by 
equality, shared beliefs, activities and concord. This was not particularly a Stoic idea per se, 
Aristotle had written of this in the Nicomachean Ethics.
216
 Powell maintains with some logic 
and justification that this was in a sense an appeal for loyalty in friendship. In the Roman 
context of Cicero’s writing that the  notion of loyalty is something that was taken very 
seriously by the Romans in their particular understanding of friendship. Powell writes that 
Romans would have taken friendship to mean support in all matters and this was to be 
outwardly expressed in public, a failure to do so would be taken by the Romans as ‘a personal 
insult’.217  
Cicero speaking through Laelius, attempts to clarify the reasons why friendship can 
only exist between good men, as these are the men who are by their very natures unselfish 
and also completely equal and so fair minded with each other. Yet he does however, much 
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like Aristotle allow for inferior friendships. Yet the notion of there being a true and perfect 
friendship would have appealed to the Stoics who would see that only the wise( substituted 
by good) could maintain friendships because in they were both true and perfect and so had 
stability in virtue. This is contrasted with the lower class or inferior type of friendship that 
would not last too long after it had served it predeterminded purpose of either servicing 
pleasure or some utility. However, by making the friendship of the wise the highest and best 
form of friendship, Laelius maintains that the Stoics were again in a sense appealing to the 
ideal rather than any actual and pragmatic situation. Cicero is highly critical of the 
intransigent and the idealistic Stoics and uses Laelius to criticise the Stoics, and also give 
examples of who the Romans deemed both wise and good men, on this fact by saying: 
They[Stoics] say that nobody is a good man who is not wise. That may well be 
true, but they definition of wisdom is such that no human being has ever yet 
attained it. But we should pay attention to those things which are available in 
our own experience and in ordinary life, not things that are merely imagined or 
wished for. I would never say that Gaius Fabricus, Manius Curius or Tiberius 
Coruncanius, whom our ancestors judged to be wise men, were wise by the 
standards of the philosophers. Let them[the Stoics] therefore keep for their own 
use the name of wisdom, invidious and obscure as it is, provided that they grant 
that those were wise men. Yet they will not even do that; for they say that 
nobody but a wise man is entitled to be called good.
218
 
 
In stating his intention to not look to something that is either imagined or wished for, Cicero, 
through Laelius, is again showing the influence of Panaetius on him, and his[Panaetius] 
departure from the early Stoics by concentrating on real issues concerning morality not look 
to the ideal sage. Laelius, argues that only the good will know why they are friends, whereas 
the common sort of friendship it will be guided by opinion more than true knowledge. Hence 
a difference of opinion may well led to quarrling among the common mass:  
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Since friendship has the effect of( as it were) turning a number of minds 
into one, how can that happen if even the individual himself does not 
have a single mind that is always the same, but one that is changeable and 
inconstant and many-sided? 
219
  
 
This is true for the friendship of the good because the friendship of the good, is based on 
virtue and so is stable and by having concord both parties will never quarrel, for friendship 
can only exist in virtue.
220
 True friendships may never be changed because based in virtue 
and follonwing nature, one might see that nature herself does not change.
221
 The wise man’s 
concern for the well being of his friends and his state is reciprocated for a friend is another 
self: ‘For he who looks at a true friend, sees as it were a reflection of himself’.222 This notion 
of the alter ego has its origins with Aristotle.
223
 To the Stoics self love is natural for is in 
accordance with the primary instinct. Through the evolution of oikeiosis, the individual sees 
others and these natually become the object of love and affection. It is natural for humans to 
care for one another as due to their sharing of humanity, so humans will naturally care for 
those that are akin to them.
224
 This love and affection will be consummated and maintained 
friendship.   
 In following Panaetius, Cicero through Laelius draws a distinction between the 
friendship of the common man and fellowship of the sage.
225
 Cicero appears to follow this 
line by setting up an opposition between stoic ‘idealisms’ in regards to friendship, and the 
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practical reality of it, by using Roman friendship as the basis for example. Friendship is that 
aspect that goes hand in hand with virtue, as it is the community of virtues: 
For friendship is in fact nothing other than a community of views on all matters 
human and divine, together with goodwill and affection; and I am not sure that 
the gods have given men better gifts than this, leaving aside wisdom.
226
 
    
Friendship for him is the union of thought and action by virtuous or good men. But this is 
founded and based in the understanding of oikeiosis as natural rational assent and justice 
which naturally flows from the utility of reason. Cicero has Laelius base his ideal friendship 
in the fellowship of the good but yet makes a clear distinction between the Greeks and the 
Romans. In a criticism of the Stoics ‘idealism’ Laelius argues that while there might be too 
much effort put into defining the good, and while it might be right to do so, it does not offer 
any assistance in understanding and application to everyday life.
227
 Having such an idealistic 
definition of the good means that there are no practical examples of this in which ordinary 
men might follow. In this respect, one might see why Cicero distinguishes between the two 
types of friendship, and one might hear echoes of Panaetius in Cicero’s words.228 Laelius will 
give an explanation of the word ‘virtue’ from his Roman perspective, and how it is used, and 
not just a philosophical definition of the word.
229
 It is indeed interesting that, for Cicero, his 
general exposition of friendship is not unlike that of the Peripatetics. What is meant by this is 
that when one considers Aristotle’s three definitions of friendship230, the three types tend to 
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blend into each other, and much the same as in Roman friendships, the lines of definition 
become blurred. Roman frienships inhabited the gray zone unlike the Stoics who drew a 
definite defining line between perfect and ordinary friendship. By giving Roman examples, 
and at times criticising the ‘apparent’ overly idealistic stance of the Stoics,231 is more 
evidence of Cicero’s alignment with the Peripatetics concerning friendship. Powell cities 
numerous instances in the dialogue where Cicero through Laelius seems to have a definite 
Peripatetic ‘flavour’ in the account of friendship,232 and it would seem that in his 
understanding of most of the friendships in On Friendship, Cicero is speaking about the 
Peripatetic model which could be in turn a reflection of Cicero’s following of the 
philosophical method of Panaetius, who merged Peripatetic philosophical understanding with 
Stoic philosophy.  
It would be beneficial at this point to discuss the meaning of the word amicitia as 
Cicero and indeed most Romans of his time would have understood it. In On Friendship, 
when Cicero has Laelius speak of ideal or perfect friendships, he has in mind examples of 
those friendships which were both pragmatic and humanly attainable. True friendships were 
based on having high moral standards, and also similar views and common interests, and are 
given as examples of these friendships in the dialogue. The friendship of Laelius and Scipio, 
for one example, and his own friendship with Atticus as another: but what he labels common 
friendship he associates with Roman political life.
233
 High moral standards and similarity of 
views and interests, a fundamental aspect of friendship of the wise was rarely found in the 
competitive arena of Roman political life, and so made the ideal form of friendship for 
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Cicero, often impossible to attain.
234
 Laelius speaks of this quiet plainly in the text: ‘True 
friendship as very difficult to find among those who spend their lives in politics and positions 
of power’.235 So why would Cicero use the word amicitia to describe the common sort of 
political everyday alliances that most Romans knew and understood to be as anything less 
than the ideal? Roman politics was a business which placed a high level of importance on 
one’s public image. Romans expected those they called friends to support them in public 
debates and in senatorial debates. However what Cicero maintains when he uses the words 
amicitia speaking in the political context is something more akin to collegiality and is a world 
away from how he would consider his friendship with Atticus.
236
 Roman political life was 
based in the association of the individual with a particular political faction. This faction had 
interests and so the individuals who were members of a particular faction was expected to 
engage in relationships and make alliances with those whom might be of some private 
advantage to them and political advantage to their respective parties. D. Konstan writes that:   
The parties to these shifting alliances grounded in private favour were said to be 
amici, which captured the individual nature of such ties and at the same time 
reduced them to a matter of practical affilation having nothing to do with real 
and lasting affection. This, moreover, was taken to be the entire content of 
Roman amicitica.
237
 
 
From the above passage it is also clear to see why Cicero would place political 
friendships on the superficial level. Differences in political affiliations and public interests 
would naturally push this inferior sort of friendship apart; Friendship born out of a sense of 
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recriprocity
238
 was always to be inferior because when the debt was repaid then the friendship 
based in utility would necessarily and naturally come to an end. But Cicero goes against this 
notion of friendships being, in a sense, maintained due to a seris of reciprocated acts, he 
writes that in true friendship the reward is the goodwill and affection that will in tiself be self-
sufficient, an an end in itself : ‘Friendship is desirable for us not because we are attracted by 
the thought of recompense, but because the affection contains its own fruits within itself.’239 
Here Cicero through Laelius speaks contra to the Epicureans who would see friendship as a 
utility for pleasure. Laelius scolds them and saying that by looking only to pleasure 
‘something so lowly and despised’ they can never set their thoughts on the ‘noble and 
divine’.240 Yet he is mindful of the difficulties that are faced when one establishes friendships 
of worth. He writes that one must put the friendship through trail, testing the characters that 
one might deem worthy of friendship, as there are no suitable outwardly signs or marks to 
read who is most suitable to call a friend. Caution is key, and Cicero through Laelius makes 
the analogy of testing horses to testing potential friends. In good faith, both stability and 
sincerity are founded and kept, whereas nothing that is untrustworthy is stable.
241
  
There is thus a need for consistency in true friendships, for reason is consistent.
242
 
True friendships can never be realised, and thus maintained, until the mind is mature and 
stable, unlike the friendships formed in youth and to whom friendship is a passing matter, but 
for the mature however , true friendship is naturally a product of reason.
243
 He gives a very 
vivid image when he speaks of this, by meantioning that just as the youth will cast off the 
toga praetexta, so too will they cast off the childish friendships. This is not to say that all 
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childhood friendships would be cast aside merely that it is a natural thing as maturity takes 
it’s course. According to the theory of oikieiosis the youth naturally matures into rationality 
this will led the youth towards others or places where they might feel affiliation. Cicero is 
therefore correct in saying that the origin of friendship is not found in need but in reason. 
Good will is formed in the perfection of reason, and so maturity will have to be reached 
before true friendship can be realised: ‘In general one cannot judge friendships until the 
parties have reached full strength and maturity, both in age and intellect’.244 It is uniformity 
of interests that keep friendships together while differences will only break it apart. Hence, 
rational maturity is given importance in his discussion at this point: 
Different ways of life entail different interests, and difference of interests 
pushes friendships apart. Indeed there is no other reason why good men cannot 
be the friends of bad men, or bad men of good, than that there is the greatest 
possible difference of interests and way of life between them.
245
 
 
Interesting to note that Cicero is clearly claiming that differences of interest can drive 
friendships apart. For while plainly acknowledging that differences do occur in life, and thus, 
different interests arise for such things. Cicero then reminds the reader that there cannot be 
plurality in friendship. As said earlier, for Cicero the interests of the individual and the state 
cannot be separated. However, Cicero is aware of the tensions in doing this, and asks a 
fundamental question for the discussion: ‘Let us first examine, if you will, the question of 
how far love for a friend ought to be taken’.246 Fundamental because as we have seen, for 
Cicero friendship was born out of love and it is in affection and affliation for others that true 
friendship is born, maintained and also flourishes. So why would this love also appear to call 
for a compromise? For Cicero in the friendship of the good the prime maxim is harmony and 
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concord. For Cicero initally there is be absolutely no way that loyalty for a friend should ever 
be manifested in armed insurrection against the state. He has Laelius give two examples of 
this to illustrate his point and uses examples that Roman readers would be familiar with.
247
 
Interestingly, Konstan argues that this part of the dialogue was influenced more by 
contempory events at the time of its construction.
248
 Laelius is adamant that one should never 
put the interest of a friend before that of the country.
249
 Wary as he is however of the 
situation that he finds himself in, Laelius later appears to rebuke what he has said and softens 
his hardline approach by offering that there is scope for compromise in this matter. As Powell 
points out Cicero accordingly gives a Roman tinge to his answer by highlighting that this 
compromise is acceptable as long as one’s reputation is never to be compromised.250 Laelius 
explains the compromise below: 
However, if by some chance it happens that one has to help a friend in some 
objective that is not quite right, and their life or reputation is at stake, one 
should depart from the straight course as long as extreme disgrace does not 
follow. There is a certain extent to which faults can be pardoned on account of 
friendship. However, one’s reputation is certainly not to be neglected.
251
 
    
So it would seem that the interests of the country and of the friend may, in fact, be different at 
times. Yet in certain aspects the friendship can and would endure. Cicero through Laelius is 
attempting to walk to fine line between his undertanding of the mutal support that friends 
offer each other and also the political situation that friendships find themselves in. That is not 
to suggest that he is being inconsistant by offering this compromise, but more likely that he is 
                                                          
247
 Ibid., 36-37. 
248
 Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World, p. 131. 
249
 Cicero, De Amicitia, 40: Haec igitur lex in amicitia sanciatur, ut neque rogemus res turpes, nec facimus 
rogati. Turpis enim excusatio est et minime accipienda, cum in ceteris peccatis, tum si quis contra rem publicam 
se amici causa fecisse fateatur. 
250
 See, Ibid.,  p. 97. For Powell’s commentary on the text. 
251
 Ibid., 61: Ut enim si qua fortuna acciderit ut minus iustae amicorum voluntates adiuvandae sint, in quibus 
eorum aut caput agatur aut fama, declinandum de via sit, modo ne summa turpitude  sequatur. Est enim 
quatenus amicitiae dari venia posit. Nec vero neglegenda est fama. 
81 
 
being pragmatic. But differences of interests do occur and change naturally over the years, as 
humans live.  
As friendship draws men together, it also draws the state together and it also draws 
the universe together.
252
 But this can also be said to be utility in the sense that utility is the 
process by which most men come together, for example, to practice reason or for common 
security, as Aristotle would have thought. However, for Aristotle friendship based in utility is 
one of the facetes of a lower form of friendship, but even the highest form of friendship for 
him would have some element of utility, i.e., the need for others, in order to practice the 
virtues with. So too for Cicero, utility is the aspect that draws people initally together.
253
 
Though the higher form of friendship -the fellowship of the wise- would only be associated 
with the wealthy and upper classes of Roman society, in an attempt to render examples of the 
Stoic ideal in Roman social life. The ordinary man would have to be content with an 
Aristotelian practical version of friendship. This could explain why Cicero would write that: 
What comes from a friend becomes pleasant precisely when it is done with 
goodwill. And so far from friendships being cultivated because of need, it is 
those who have least need of the wealth and resources of others, and especially 
of their virtue (in which the greatest protection lies), who are the kindest and 
most generous. And yet perhaps it is not an advantage either if friends never 
lack anything at all.
254
 
   
However, there might be another, much more practical, explanation. One may think that 
Cicero is following the rule of thumb of the day, in that the rich were forbidden by 
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convention to deal in daily business; that was the way of the common and lower classes.
255
 
The rich were not expected to be found in the market place, haggling over the purchase of 
products, but in the great halls of government, processing the administration of the state.
256
 
But utility is perfectly fine for beginning a friendship, and it is most natural. So, one wonders, 
if Cicero really believes that utility is necessarily a bad thing? In many instances in On 
Friendship Cicero gets Laelius to emphasize the mutual benefits in gaining and maintaining 
friendships, and also mentions that there is both pleasure and profit in the inferior kind of 
friendship. So if this be the case then what else would the higher form of perfect friendship 
have to offer? or as Powell suggests and with some justification that Cicero is being 
somewhat rhetorical.
257
 
In conclusion, when enquiring about the nature of friendship, Cicero was enquiring 
about the subject at the very core of human nature. The middle Stoics, and later the Roman 
ones, by altering and reconstructing the maxims of the earlier Stoics were in a sense allowing 
space for friendship to mature and in such a way for a virtuous life to be envisaged as a 
practical reality. By placing emphasis on the development of ones own individual nature and 
the role that both choice and thus, responsibility will play in an individual’s life, the Stoics of 
the middle period were able to place the way to a perfection of virtue within the boundaries 
of the pragmatic and not just the ideal. Out of this need for pragmatisim, oikeiosis evolved. 
Initally being seen as the way in which one feels about ones self within the world, by splitting 
this theory into two Cicero was able to give an explaination of just how the Stoics saw the 
individual initally in the world and later the naturallness of social interaction between rational 
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beings. By maintaining oikeiosis as a theory which explained rational assention through 
maturity and ethical evolution the Stoics were able to explain the naturalness of both 
affection and socialability that is found in the world. Affection firstly from adults to a child 
and later, replicated for all rational beings in general. The idea of the cosmopolis and also of 
philanthropy came from this understanding. Friendship was also explained as being natural 
and also a duty.  For friendship is so tied with all that is human, it is natural and necessary.  
Though Cicero admires the Stoic stance on the issue, he has been shown to accept the 
Peripatetic idea, preferring the practical over the ideal, as it were. All that is the best in 
mankind is found in friendship, and in that sense it is totally natural and necessary if we are 
to live a life, said to be, in accordance with nature, or even one in agreement with it. 
Friendship in itself is a virtue for the Stoics, it is the means by which the sage may practice 
his virtue. By living the virtuous life and practicing friendship, one can be said to be living 
the good life. However, this would in mean that friendship seen in this light, was initally 
undertaken for its utility. Something which Cicero staunchly criticises the Epicureans about. 
But later is happy to admit that friendship while not born in utility does give utility to life as 
it matures.
258
 For the Stoics, one must attempt to look rationally at what they understood by 
friendship. It was in friendship that the cosmopolis was established, managed and flourished, 
there was no utility only a mutual and rational understanding of what was virtuous. 
Happiness was found not solely within, but owing to the theory of oikeiosis very much 
without in the world around him. Happiness encompassed all of that which made human life 
human. A rational way of explaining the natural need and affection for others and that we 
give and in turn recieve. Self-sufficiency might have been indeed a good idea, but in reality 
just cannot work, the theory of oikeiosis and the very nature of friendship itself speak plainly 
and demonstrate this fact.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has attempted to show that while the early Stoics held to the maxim that virtue 
alone is self-sufficient for happiness, the members of the middle period did appear to both 
compromise and alter this maxim naturally.
259
 Cicero appears to have seen where there were 
problematic elements in the Stoic position and has demonstrated this, I feel, in his discussions 
of it. While the Stoic argument has, at times, been persuasive, Cicero, through his own 
refutations and by citing those arguments of the Peripatetics allows for equally persuasive 
counter arguments. The Stoic philosophical concept of virtue being self-sufficient for 
happiness would appear to be idealistic rather than the reality shared by most of humanity, 
whereas, the Peripatetic one, which admits ‘external goods’ would seem more sympathetic to 
the human lived experience. There might be distinction between the wise and the rest of 
humanity in erly Stoicism, but through understanding of our human nature, Cicero and 
Panaetius would say, we can find happiness and perfection. This idea of perfection no longer 
the sole property of the sage but in everyone who has even the sembalance of reason adn 
thus, virtue. This will necessarily allow for the inclusion of external goods i.e health, friends, 
family, into the pantheon of requirements for the happy life. Wisdom would appear to be the 
acknowlegement of this, the sage is a human being rather than anything akin to a god. 
The view might then be that the sage is considered wise because he knows that virtue 
must include external objects in order to be complete. As nature created both mind and body, 
so care and consideration of both would seem to be wisdom in itself, and thus, would set the 
wise man above the rest. He knows that his happiness comes from the very act of 
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harmonization between his human nature and that of the natural world which he inhabits. He 
can see external factors for what they most truly are, judge them necessarily and in the 
process either deny them a place in his reasoned happiness or accept them into it. His 
happiness is not in the promotion of mind over body, but in the understanding that both are a 
working unit. Through the act of harmonization, he will just his reason, thus his virtue and 
thus achieve happiness. If happiness is truly a universal concept and as understood by the 
majority of humanity, then it is something that needs external goods in order to flourish. The 
Stoics did appear to understand this and adapted the early maxim on happiness to now 
include external goods. The theory of indifferents was an answer to the criticism that the 
early maxim was ultimately far too idealistic and aloof, and simply could not be applicable  
to the vast amount of human beings. This practicality was also expressed in oikeiosis, initally 
understood as the primary instinct and later as the rational maturity in man. It became in later 
years the way in which one might see that self-sufficicent ideas of happiness were moved to 
one side and replaced with a greater emphasis on the natural social instinct found in man. 
This is given credence by Cicero’s exposition of the importance of oikeiosis in Stoic moral 
philosophy, and the central role it played regarding both friendship and social interaction. 
Oikeiosis is fundamental to human nature and also its rational evolution; as it is the mode of 
virtuous perfection. Friendship is fastened tightly to human nature because it is completely 
rational and also virtuous, as in that it is an end in itself. Friendship as Cicero wrote in 
Laelius on Friendship: ‘creeps in some way or other in everybody’s life, and does not allow 
any mode of life to be free of it’.260 So in the Stoic sense it is therefore good, natural and 
necessary. Deemed necessary as it is the medium through which virtue is practiced and it is 
the emphasis on the practical application of friendship that Cicero is at all times promoting. 
This of course would appear more in line with the Peripatetic view of friendship. However, it 
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might also be that Cicero is merely expressing what was expected of Roman friendships, in 
both political circles and personally intimate ones.           
Virtue, in the sense, that it is associated with utter rationality, might be counted as 
being self-sufficient in the Stoic sense, but it does need some allowance for external goods in 
order to be maintained, both friendship and also oikeiosis are a testament to this. As both are 
tied to happiness, and are both ways in which virtue is maintained and expressed. So are both 
an integral part of any life that is in confomrity with the natural law and is lived in 
accordance with nature. Self-sufficiency in theory can be expressed as a perfected idea of the 
human condition, but in reality just cannot work. Man, is just not self-sufficient in any 
possible way, neither in his nature nor his biological construction. Therefore, the theory just 
cannot work in any practical sense because ultimately happiness has to and must encompass 
all aspects of human nature not just one part of it. 
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